Baluchistan formed the
western borderlands of the former British India. What the British sought here
was not political dominion, but suzerainty, as the cheapest and most
efficient way of controlling the area inhabited by fiercely independent
tribes. This did not require direct administration of British India.1
Baluchistan that Pakistan inherited consisted of three types of
territory. First, there was a long strip of territory separating
Baluchistan from Afghanistan and the Northwest Frontier Province, which
was directly administered by the British. The purpose of this
territory was to have a buffer to isolate the Baluch tribes from their
neighbours. Then there were districts leased from the Khan of Kalat
after the original annexation. Both these territories, the leased and
the directly administered strip, were under the control of Chief
Commissioner. Chiefs, who had treaty relationships with the British,
controlled the rest of Baluchistan. They had internal independence but
the Government of British India controlled their external relations. The
Khan of Kalat was the most important of these chiefs, whose territories
were divided amongst a number of feudatories with different levels of
independence. Three of these feudatories – Makran, Las Bela
and Kharan – had emerged as separate political entities by
1947, and with Kalat formed the Baluchistan States Union. They were
something more than tribes, but less than states.2
The Viceroy to British India, Lord Lytton, invited the Khan of Kalat to
attend the imperial assemblage at Delhi in January 1877. A nationalist
historian has argued that the British regarded the Khan of Kalat as
independent because on this occasion he was not given a flag like the
other princes. Moreover, the Viceroy received the Khan and the
Sultan of Oman and also paid them return visits. None of these gestures
was made to other princes, he argues, because they were not regarded as
independent.3 However, British policy changed with the ascension
of Abdur Rehman as the Amir of Kabul in the late nineteenth century,
when Afghanistan became pro-British. Sir J. Brown, who was the successor
of Sandeman, deposed the independent Khan and had Mir Mahmud II
installed as the Khan of Kalat. The British also framed a new
constitution for Kalat.4
In 1942 the Khan wrote to the Cripps Mission and forwarded the
case of an independent Khanate of Baluchistan. In the same year, the
Secretary of State for India informed the Viceroy about the British
policy towards the Khanate, denying its status as an independent,
sovereign, and a non-Indian state. The decision of the
Government of British India was conveyed to the Khan in June 1942. The British
gave legal arguments, which were not contested by the Khan. The Khan
re-opened the question in 1946 at the end of the Second World War.5
The Accession
Kalat did not feature large in the competition between India and
Pakistan for the accession of princely states at the time of independence. Since it was on the periphery of the Indian sub-continent, it
did not hold the same importance as Kashmir or Hyderabad, or even
Junagadh. Nor did it have the conflict of the ruler belonging to one
faith while its population belonged to another, as both were Muslim.
However, the Quaid-i-Azam had promised Kalat and other princely states
independence, if they acceded to Pakistan. Independence in this context
meant that foreign affairs, defence and communications would be handled
by Pakistan.
The Prime Minister of Kalat, Muhamed Aslam, went to meet the Nawab
of Bhopal, the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes, in December 1946
to discuss the future status of Kalat state. He gave an account of this
meeting in a letter to Lancelot Griffin, Assistant to the Crown
Representative.6 The meeting, he said, was to discuss Kalat’s
three concerns once the British had withdrawn: the relationship of Kalat
with India and the rest of the world, the return of the leased areas of
Nushki, Quetta and Nasirabad to Kalat, and the future of the feudatory
states like Las Bela and Kharan, and the tribal areas like the Bugti and
Marri territories.7 The letter recounts all the treaties
concluded between Kalat and the British Government in India, and then
quotes from Article 3 of the Treaty of 1876 that binds the British
Government “to respect the independence of Kalat”,
and that this Treaty is in force at the present time.8
The same letter to Lancelot Griffin said that the Government of British India Act of 1935 held the Kalat state as situated in India, but argued
that the state was not consulted in the drafting of this Act, and in
response the Khan of Kalat had written to the Crown Representative
protesting the infringement of the Treaty of 1876. The Crown
Representative had replied that he recognized the 1876 Treaty as valid
which would form the basis of the relationship of Kalat and the British
Government. 9
The letter also discussed the future of the territories leased
from Kalat by the British, and that when the British relinquished
control of these areas, they should be restored to the Khan of Kalat,
their rightful owner. It argued that the Khan was the head of the Baluch
Confederacy, and the suzerain of the Kharan and Las Bela states, and
that all Baluch tribes are anxious to preserve their “national
existence” and stay out of the Indian Union.10
Muhamed Aslam said that the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes had
appreciated the point of view that Kalat could not be party to any
formal negotiations conducted by the Negotiating Committee of the
Chamber of Princes with the Constituent Assembly, without compromising
its position as an independent state in the Treaty of 1876.11
As the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, sought to settle the question of
accession of all princely states, Kalat was the subject of a meeting on
July 19, 1947. At this meeting Lord Mountbatten, the Crown
Representative, said that those districts which all acknowledged to be
administered by Kalat were Mekran, Jhalawan, Sarawan, Kachhi, Dombki and
Kaheri. He also said that Las Bela and Kharan were disputed, as their
rulers claimed not to be under the suzerainty of the Khan of Kalat.12.
At this meeting, the Prime Minister of Kalat, Nawabzada Aslam Khan,
claimed that the relationship of Kalat with the British Government was
defined in the Treaty of 1876 as one of an independent, sovereign state.
While the Viceroy said he would accept this only for the purposes of
negotiations, Nishtar, the Pakistan government representative said that
he would not contest this claim.
Lord Mountbatten said that the four territories of Quetta, Nushki,
Nasirabad and Bolan, which had been leased by Kalat to the British
Government in India, were the issues at hand. The Kalat representative
claimed that with the transfer of power, these should be returned to
Kalat. The Government of Pakistan’s claim was “based
on the grounds that the successor authorities in India would, in
relation to foreign states, inherit all Treaty obligations incurred on
behalf of India, and the Pakistan Government would be heir to the
obligations (both burdens and benefits) arising out of treaties with
Kalat, as they would be, for example, to the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of
1921”.13
The Viceroy also maintained he had been advised that, according to
international law, treaties such as these were inherited by the
successor states, while treaties with states over which the Crown had
exercised paramountcy, would lapse and could not be transferred to
successor states. He also said that provision had been made for this in
the Indian Independence Bill. It was agreed between all parties present
that the Khan of Kalat and the Quaid-i-Azam should discuss the matter.14
It seems quite clear that the Government of Pakistan did not want any
doubt to be cast about its retention of the leased areas, which included
Quetta, the most important city of Baluchistan, and also the centre of
communications. The recognition of Kalat’s indepen-dence put
Pakistan in a strong legal position to inherit the leased areas from
British India.
It was at the same meeting of July 19, 1947 that the Viceroy Lord
Mountbatten mentioned that the status of Kharan and Las Bela was
disputed as the rulers of these two states claimed not to be under the
suzerainty of the Khan of Kalat.15
While discussing the future of Kalat, Lord Mountbatten said that he
would meet the representatives of the other princely states and suggest
to them that they should adhere to one or the other of the Dominions.
The newly formed Union of India had reduced its demand for adherence to the states
only to the subjects of defence, communications and foreign affairs. He
further said that since there were only few such states in the case of
Pakistan, Mr Jinnah was willing to discuss the question of the method
and degree of adherence with each individually.16 He went on to argue
that paramountcy would lapse with the transfer of power, and states
would become independent de jure, but de facto very few were likely to
benefit from it. He said that adherence to a Dominion was the only
way of maintaining some form of relationship between the Crown and the
states. He advised Kalat that although it had liberty of choice, it
should associate with Pakistan on some terms.17 The Prime Minister of
Kalat, Aslam Khan’s responded that the Khan of Kalat wanted to
come to an amicable settlement with Pakistan, which would be of mutual
benefit.
The minutes of the same meeting reveal the Khan of Kalat claimed that
Jinnah had asked him whether he would be willing to send representatives
to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, but he had responded in the
negative, saying it would not be possible because of Kalat’s
independent status. However, more importantly, the Khan had agreed
with Jinnah that an understanding must be reached between Kalat and
Pakistan on defence, external affairs and communications. The Viceroy
opined that agreement on these subjects was essential.18
A series of meetings between the Viceroy, as the Crown’s
Representative, the Quaid and the Khan of Kalat followed, which resulted
in a communiqué on August 11, 1947. The communiqué stated that:
The Government of Pakistan recognizes Kalat as an independent sovereign
state in treaty relations with the British Government with a status
different from that of British Indian States.
Legal opinion will be sought as to whether or not agreements of leases will be inherited by the Pakistan Government.
Meanwhile, a Standstill Agreement has been made between Pakistan and Kalat.
Discussions will take place between Pakistan and Kalat at Karachi at an
early date with a view to reaching decisions on Defence, External
Affairs and Communications.
While the Quaid on behalf of the Government of Pakistan agreed to
recognize Kalat as an independent and a sovereign State, the Khan of
Kalat tried to get the Crown Representative to do so as well. The Crown
Representative refused on the basis of an advice from his political
adviser, saying: “The Treaties of 1854 and 1876 do not lead to
the inference that Kalat is an independent sovereign state and it has
in fact, always been regarded as an Indian state. It figures as such in
Part II of the 1st Schedule of the Government of India Act of
1935…”19 He then went onto express the hope that
“a close understanding between Pakistan and Kalat on matters
concerning foreign affairs, communications and defence, analogous to the
understandings between the Government of the Dominion of India and the
States which have acceded to it.”
It is clear from the draft communiqué and the UK High
Commissioner’s letter discussing it that not only was the
British Government unhappy with Pakistan’s recognition of
Kalat as an independent and a sovereign State, but it also did not want
it to become a precedent. Hodson has repeatedly argued that
Mountbatten’s main motivation in preventing the states from
exercising the independence option was his concern that it would lead to
the fragmentation of India.
Lawrence Grafftey-Smith, High Commissioner of the UK in Pakistan, while
commenting on the draft communiqué, expressed grave reservations about
Pakistan’s recognition of Kalat’s independence,
saying: “Nothing we could do to prevent the Government of
Pakistan from recognizing Kalat’s independent status although
this step seems to be of doubtful political wisdom and contrary to our
interests elsewhere.” He goes on to explain the cause of his
discomfiture, saying: “This precedent may well encourage
Hyderabad in maintaining its claim to independence in its negotiations
with the Government of India…the admission of
Kalat’s claim means the emergence of a weak buffer state on
the frontiers of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan”.20 It has
been argued that Mountbatten was against any state becoming independent
and harried them into acceding to one of the Dominions because he feared
the fragmentation of India.21
A memo by Arthur Henderson, the Minister of State for Commonwealth
Relations Office, hinted at the advantage to Pakistan of recognising the
independence of Kalat, saying: “Pakistan has entered into
negotiations with Kalat on the basis of recognizing the
State’s claim to independence and of treating the previous
agreements between the Crown and Kalat providing for the lease of Quetta
and other areas, which would otherwise lapse under Section 7(1)(b) of
the Indian Independence Act, as international agreements untouched by
the termination of Paramoutcy.”22 The memorandum further
state: “The UK High Commissioner in Pakistan is being informed
of the position and asked to do what he can to guide the Pakistan
Government away from making any agreement with Kalat which would involve
recognition of the State as a separate international entity.”
It also discussed the effect of the policy that Pakistan had adopted
towards Kalat on the state of Kashmir: “One consequence might
well be that the Pakistan Government would be obliged to concede to
Kashmir a similar recognition, although Kashmir has certainly never been
independent, having been created by the British for the present dynasty
on the conclusion of the Sikh wars and is hardly equipped to maintain
the international responsibilities of an independent State vis-à-vis its
neighbours, Russia and China”.23
The Khan wanted both issues of the state’s accession to
Pakistan and the future of the leased areas to be settled
simultaneously. It is argued that he would have preferred to have treaty
relations with Pakistan as an independent state, rather than sign the
Instrument of Accession, but might have agreed to the latter if was
offered favourable terms in respect of the leased areas. At least this
was the understanding of Sir Grafftey-Smith.24
Grafftey-Smith mentions in his memo of September 24, 1947 to the
Commonwealth Relations Office that a draft Instrument of Accession has
been sent to the Khan of Kalat, and it is in the same form as the
Junagadh Instrument, but that the Khan is unlikely to accept it.25
Referring to a Savingram No. 55 of October 17, 1947 from Grafftey-Smith,
the Political Department, in a note on Pakistan-Kalat negotiations,
says that Jinnah has had second thoughts regarding the recognition of
Kalat as an independent sovereign state, and is now desirous of
obtaining its accession in the same form as was accepted by other rulers
who joined Pakistan. The same note mentions that an interesting
situation is developing as Pakistan might accept the accession of
Kalat’s two feudatories, Las Bela and Kharan, and points out
that this is like Junagadh, where India is negotiating directly with
Mangrol. However, it says, the significant difference between the two
situations is that the Crown Representative recognised Kharan and Las
Bela as independent states prior to August 15, 1947, which was not the
case with Mangrol.26 The note also mentions that the Khan has assured
Jinnah of having no intention of opening negotiations with Iran,
Afghanistan or India, but observed that the situation would become very
difficult if the Khan attempted to open negotiations with New Delhi.
On August 15, 1947 when the British withdrew from India, the Khan of
Kalat said in his speech: “I thank God that one aspiration,
that is independence, has been achieved, but the other two, the
enforcement of Shariah-i-Muhammadi and unification of Baluch people,
remain to be fulfilled.”27 The speech was delivered in
the Baluchi language, with promises to work towards the unfulfilled
aspirations. He also expressed the sense of incompleteness of the
process of unification and independence, and appeared to be referring to
the leased areas, which Pakistan had inherited from British India.
What complicated the situation was the desire of Kharan and Las
Bela, two feudatories of Kalat, to accede to Pakistan, irrespective of
Kalats decision. Moreover, Mekran, which was a district of Kalat, wanted
to do the same. There are a plethora of letters from the rulers of
Kharan and Las Bela entreating the Quaid to accept the accession of
their states to Pakistan, irrespective of Kalats decision. Mir Mohammed
Habibullah Khan, the ruler of Kharan, wrote to the Quaid on August 21,
1947: I announce on behalf of myself and my subjects;and joins Pakistan
Dominion as its suzerain and promises to serve Pakistan up to its
extent.28 In each successive letter, Habibullah Khan makes it apparent
that the supremacy of Kalat is unacceptable to him. He wrote to the
Quaid in November 1947, by then the Governor-General of Pakistan: 29 ;My
State will never submit to the dictates of the Kalat State and will
continue to oppose any moves aimed at an interference of the State;s
freedom to act. ;29 A few days later writing again to the
Governor-General, he argued that it is not possible any longer for
Kharan to bear the undue interference from the Kalat state, and
described the legal status of Kharan in these words: ;Following the
lapse of the British paramountcy, Kharan repudiated the supremacy of
Kalat and acceded to Pakistan.;30 Kharan also complained that Kalat was
arming the ;mischief mongers ; in Kharan with the purpose of creating
law and order situation in Pakistan-controlled areas.
By October 1947, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah had a change of
heart on the recognition of Kalat as an “Independent and a
Sovereign State”, and wanted the Khan to sign the same form of
instrument of accession as the other states which had joined
Pakistan.31 The Khan was unwilling to abandon the nominally achieved
independent status but ready to concede on defence, foreign affairs and
communications. However, he was unwilling to sign either a treaty or an
Instrument, until and unless he had got a satisfactory agreement on the
leased areas.32 Fears were also being voiced that officials of the
Government of Pakistan might start dealing with the two feudatories of
Las Bela and Kharan, and accept their de facto accession, as these two
feudatories “were recognized by the Crown Representative as
separate States” prior to August 15, 1947.33
Mir Mohammad Habibullah Khan, the ruler of Kharan, wrote to the
Quaid-i-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah in December 1947 and explained why
Kharan did not accept the suzerainty of Kalat. He said that before the
advent of the British, Kharan was under the influence of Afghanistan,
and that it was in 1883 that it accepted the paramountcy of Britain.
Kharan, he said, received an allowance of Rs. 6,000 per year from the
British until August 15, 1947 in lieu of the allowance it used to get
from Afghanistan. He argued that Kharan was an independent state under
the paramountcy of the British. Kalat, he said, has always wanted to
subjugate Kharan, and even launched an armed attack against Kharan in
1939 to force it to accept Kalat’s hegemony. Habibullah
Khan then declared: “After August 15, 1947, Kharan is
absolutely an independent State. It has decided to accede to Pakistan.
However, whether Kharan joins Pakistan or remains outside, this much is
clear that it will never, in any way, accept Kalat’s
hegemony.”34 His position about the Brohi Confederacy was that
Sardar Azad Khan, the ruler of Kharan, had not recognized the Khan of
Kalat as his Sardar during Sir Robert Sandeman’s tenure of
office.35
The ruler of Kharan in Baluchistan, while visiting Karachi in October
1947, issued a statement, saying: “Kharan was equal to Kalat
and would never suffer subordination to her; Kharan would live and, if
necessary, die for Pakistan.” Kalat continued to deny that
either of the two feudatories could be regarded as separate states. 36
By February 1948, the discussions between Kalat and the Government
of Pakistan were coming to a head. The Quaid wrote to the Khan of
Kalat: “I advise you to join Pakistan without further
delay…and let me have your final reply which you promised to
do after your stay with me in Karachi when we fully discussed the whole
question in all its aspects.”37 On February 15, 1948, the
Quaid-i-Azam visited Sibi, Baluchistan and addressed a Royal Durbar,
where he announced that until the Pakistan Constitution is finally
written in about two years time, he would govern the province with the
help of an advisory council that he would nominate. However, the main
reason for the Quaid’s visit to Baluchistan was to persuade
the Khan of Kalat to accede to Pakistan. As it transpired, the Khan
failed to turn up for the final meeting with him, pleading illness. In
his letter to the Quaid, he said that he had summoned both Houses of the
Parliament, Dar-ul-Umara and Dar-ul-Awam, for their opinion about the
future relations with the Dominion of Pakistan, and he would inform him
about their opinion by the end of the month.38
When the Dar-ul-Awam met on February 21, 1948, it decided not to accede,
but to negotiate a treaty to determine Kalat’s future
relations with Pakistan.39 According to one report, the Afghan
government was also interested in coming to an agreement with the Khan
on their own terms. The Khan of Kalat also called a meeting of the
Dar-ul-Umara to consider Quaid’s request for Kalat to accede
to Pakistan. The Dar-ul-Umara asked the Khan to seek three months to
consider this request. An intelligence report on the proceedings of the
meetings reported that copies of the Instrument of Accession were
distributed at the Dar-ul-Awam and Dar-ul-Umara before the members cast
their votes, and that the Kalat State National Party was
“propagating that accession meant restriction on their forces
and armament, undesired freedom for their women and migration of Muslim
refuges into the State which will weaken the voice of the original
residents”.40 The Khan of Kalat, the report said, made a
brief speech before the Dar-ul-Awam, in which he emphasized the need to
have friendly relations with Pakistan, and also said that the
intentions of the Quaid towards Kalat were good. The Prime Minister of
Kalat spoke next, and said that since this House had voted for
Kalat’s independence, he went to see the Quaid in January and
had a two-and-a-half hour meeting. He said the Quaid was prepared to
help the State in every way, and while independence of the State would
remain intact, the only way forward for Kalat was to accede to Pakistan
in the matters of Defence, Communications and Foreign Affairs.41 The
Prime Minister argued that with accession in respect of the three
subjects, the internal independence of Kalat would not be affected. But
Mir Ghaus Baksh Bizanjo spoke against accession to Pakistan, and he
argued that if Pakistan wanted friendship with Kalat, it should restore
its leased territories as well as Kharan and Las Bela. The House
dispersed without any intention of meeting again. Dar-ul-Umara asked for
three months to study the terms of accession in order to understand its
implications.42 The intelligence report also alleged that a day prior
to the meeting of the Dar-ul-Awam, on February 25, Agha Abdul Karim, the
brother of the Khan of Kalat, met the members of the Kalat State
National Party at Dhadar to discuss the issue of the accession of Kalat
to Pakistan, and it was here that a resolution was drafted rejecting the
accession.43
On March 9, 1948 the Khan received communication from the Quaid
announcing that he had decided not to deal personally with the Kalat
state negotiations, which would henceforth be dealt with by the Pakistan
Government. So far there had not been any formal negotiations but only
an informal request made by the Quaid to the Khan at Sibi.
This request was placed before the Council of Sardars of the state,
which asked for three months to consider the matter.44 The Khan was,
however, under pressure from the Afghan government, which would have
liked to negotiate an agreement on their own terms.45.
By early March 1948 it was obvious that Kalat’s accession was
in limbo. The Quaid met Habibullah Khan on March 4, and promised him
that a decision about Kharan’s relations with Pakistan would
be made soon.46 On March 17, 1948 the Pakistan Foreign Ministry sent a
telegram to London announcing that Kharan, Las Bela and Mekran had
applied for accession to Pakistan and their accession had been accepted.47
The US Ambassador to Pakistan in his dispatch home on March 23, 1948
informed that on March 18, “Kharan, Las Bela and Mekran,
feudatory states of Kalat” had acceded to Pakistan. He also
wrote that their accession had “reduced the size of Kalat by
more than one half, cutting that State off completely from the coast and
leaving it largely isolated. As mentioned in the
Embassy’s dispatch of March 10, the Rulers of Kharan and Las
Bela had for some time been toying with the idea of acceding to Pakistan
irrespective of the decision of the Khan of Kalat”.48 The
Khan of Kalat objected to their accession, arguing that it was a
violation of Kalat’s Standstill Agreement with Pakistan. He
also said that while Kharan and Las Bela were its feudatories, Mekran
was a district of Kalat. The British Government had placed the control
of the foreign policy of the two feudatories under Kalat in July 1947,
prior to partition.49
The ruler of Las Bela too had been lobbying with the Quaid-i-Azam
to let his state accede to Pakistan. Kharan and Las Bela appear to have
been operating in tandem on this issue.50 On September 5, 1947, Mir
Ghulam Qadir wrote to the Quaid, saying that he had already written to
the Pakistani Prime Minister offering accession of Las Bela to the
Pakistan Dominion.51 The letter also mentioned the dire economic
conditions of the people of Las Bela as its supplies seem to have been
cut off by Kalat. On March 17, 1948, Las Bela too acceded to Pakistan
along with Mekran and Kharan. However, by this time the Kalat
Government had heard a Radio Pakistan announcement that the Government
of Pakistan had accepted the separate accession of Las Bela, Kharan, and
Mekran, and wanted this report denied. 52 The Kalat Government said
that the accession of these states would be contrary to the Standstill
Agreement with Pakistan, which was recently affirmed in the House of
Commons.53
On March 18, 1948, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan
issued a press note that the States of Kharan, Las Bela and Mekran had
applied for accession to Pakistan, which was granted to them. The press
report also said that after the accession of these three states to
Pakistan, Kalat’s territory had been reduced to half of its
previous area, and had ceased to have any outlet to the sea.54 The UK
High Commissioner in Pakistan reported that the offer of accession was
accepted by the Pakistan Cabinet when Jam of Las Bela, Chief of Kharan
and Nawab Bai Khan of Mekran met the Quaid on March 17, 1948 and told
him that “if Pakistan was not prepared to accept their offers
of accession immediately, they would be compelled to take other steps
for their protection against Khan of Kalat’s aggressive
actions.”55 This was seen as a blow to the Khan as head of the
Confederacy, the Baluchistan States Union.
What finally forced the Khan of Kalat to accede was the furore
caused by news on the All India Radio that the Khan had been negotiating
with India. As a consequence of these developments, a report on March
20, claimed that the brother of the Khan, who was also the Governor of
Kalat, was leaving for Afghanistan with his wife, who was from the Royal
Afghan family.56 However, on March 28, the Reuters news agency carried a
story filed from Karachi that ‘“Gateway
State” Joins Pakistan’. The Khan issued a
communiqué, which said: “On the night of March 27, All India
Radio, Delhi announced that two months ago Kalat State had approached
the Indian Union to accept its accession to India and that the Indian
Union had rejected the request…It had never been my intention
to accede to India…It is, therefore, declared that from 9 pm
on March 27th – the time when I heard the false news over the
air, I forthwith decide to accede to Pakistan, and that whatever
differences now exist between Kalat and Pakistan be placed in writing
before Mr Jinnah, the Governor-General of Pakistan, whose decision I
shall accept.”57 The UK High Commissioner, commenting
on the Khan’s denials, wrote: “Khan’s
public denials of rumours about offers made to him by India and
Afghanistan conflict with his own statements in earlier discussion with
Pakistan representatives, when he used these offers as a blackmailing
argument. There is good reason to believe that he has been flirting with
both India and Afghanistan.” 58
While the Instrument of Accession was signed by the Khan of Kalat
on March 27, it was placed before Jinnah on March 31, 1948, who accepted
it. There was no kind of resistance to the accession till the middle of
July 1948, when the brother of the Khan returned from Afghanistan,
where he had fled with a body of armed followers. The Pakistan Army
engaged this band and the majority of his followers arrested.59
As this account makes amply clear, the story of the accession of
Kalat was a long drawn out process. And although Pakistan came into
being on August 14, 1947, the accession of Kalat did not take place till
March 27, 1948. The three feudatories, two of which Las Bela and
Kharan, which were recognized by the British as independent, played a
key role in forcing the Khan of Kalat to accede to Pakistan.
The issue of the accession of Kalat has been clouded in
controversy and mythology, because little or no research has been done
on the subject. One scholar has described the annexation as,
“a nine month tug of war that came to a climax in the forcible
annexation of Kalat.”60 The reality is quite different. Khan
of Kalat had no choice but to accede after Kharan, Las Bela and
Mekran’s acceded to Pakistan, cutting off Kalat from the sea.
The announcement on All India Radio that Kalat had been negotiating with
India, which Nehru was at pains to deny in the Indian Parliament,
caused such an outcry within Baluchistan and outside that the Khan
acceded immediately to Pakistan. It was only in July 1948, three
months after the accession of Kalat, when the Khan’s brother,
Prince Abdul Karim, returned to Kalat with a lashkar and a skirmish
took place between the lashkar and a small Pakistan army contingent.
Mountbatten’s policy towards the Indian princely states had
conclusively turned against giving the princely states the option of
independence, and the choice was accession to either of the two
Dominions. As the correspondence of the UK High Commissioner to Pakistan
shows, the British government was very concerned that Kalat should not
be granted independence. Given all the above-mentioned conditions, any
chances of Kalat being able to remain independent were just not there.
Citations
* Professor Dushka Saiyid is Allama Iqbal Fellow at Wolfson College, University of Cambridge,
United Kingdom.
Ainslie T. Embree ed., Pakistan’s Western Borderlands: The
Transformation of a Political Order, Durham, North Carolina: Carolina
Academic Press, 1977, p. xvii.
Ibid. p. xviii.
I. Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GMBH, 1987. p. 168.
Ibid. p. 170.
Ibid. p. 171.
Enclosure 1 to PS-49, Muhamed Aslam to Lancelot Griffin, Jinnah Papers,
The States: Historical and Policy Perspectives and Accession to
Pakistan, First Series, Volume VIII, Editor-in-Chief, Z. H. Zaidi,
Quaid-i-Azam Papers Project, Government of Pakistan. p. 118.
Ibid.
Ibid. p. 119.
Ibid. p. 120.
Ibid. p. 122.
Ibid. p. 123.
Ibid. PS-54, Minutes of Viceroy’s Twentieth Miscellaneous Meeting, R/3/1/166, p. 135.
Viceroy’s Miscellaneous Meetings, 20th Meeting Minutes, July
19, L/P&S/13/ 1846, Oriental Section, British Library.
Ibid.
PS-54, Minutes of Viceroy’s Twentieth Miscellaneous Meeting, R/3/1/166, Jinnah Papers. p. 135.
PS-54, Minutes of Viceroy’s Twentieth Miscellaneous Meeting, Jinnah Papers, p. 137.
Ibid.
L/P&S/13/1846, Viceroy’s Miscellaneous Meetings, 25th Meeting Minutes, August 4, 1947, p. 45.
The High Commissioner of UK in Pakistan, Draft Letter, September 22, 1947, L/P&S/13/1846.
Ibid.
Hodson, p. 361. Also see Andrew Roberts, Eminent Churchillians, p. 103.
Annexure to Annex I to PS-66, Memorandum by the Minister of State for
Commonwealth Relations, PRO, FO 371/F. 12773, Jinnah Papers. p. 154.
Ibid.
Letter from the High Commissioner for the UK in Pakistan to the
Commonwealth Relations Office, September 24, 1947, L/P&S/13/1846. p.
29.
Ibid.
Ibid. Political Department, Register No. Pol. 1422/47. p. 24.
Speech by the Ruler of Kalat, PS-67, Jinnah Papers, Vol. VIII. p. 156.
PS-128, Ruler of Kharan to M.A. Jinnah, Telegram, F.124 (5)-GG/1, Jinnah Papers. p. 223.
PS-129, Ruler of Kharan to M. A. Jinnah, 12 November, 1947, F124(5)-GG/5-6, Jinnah Papers. p. 224.
Ibid. p. 225.
Memorandum, Political Department, in response to a Savingram from
Grafftey-Smith of October 17, 1947. Register No. Pol. 1422/47,
L/P&S/13/1846.
Ibid. High Commissioner for the UK, Savingram, October 17, 1947, p. 25.
Ibid.
PS-131, Ruler of Kharan to M. A. Jinnah, F.124 (5)-GG/10-3, December 1, 1947, Jinnah Papers, p. 227.
Ibid. p. 227.
Savingram, From High Commissioner for UK in Pakistan to the Commonwealth Relations Office, October 17, 1947. L/P&S/13/1846.
Jinnah to Ruler of Kalat, PS-69, Jinnah Papers, Vol. XVIII. p. 160
Daily Telegraph, February 16, 1948, “Baluchistan ‘My Special Care’ says Mr Jinnah”.
Appreciation of Events in Pakistan, February 1948, POL: 7067/48, L/P&S/13/1847.
PS-82 and Annex to PS-82, Jinnah Papers, pp. 170-171.
Ibid. p. 171.
Ibid. p. 172.
Ibid.
Ibid. His Majesty’s Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Whitehall, London, p. 74.
LP&S/13/1847, Appreciation of events in Pakistan, POL: 7067/48, P. 73.
PS-132, Ruler of Kharan to M. A. Jinnah, F.124(11)-GG/17-9 (Original in Urdu), Jinnah Papers. p. 227.
PS-133, Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Geoffrey Prior, Telegram, F. 20-GG/13, March 17, 1948, Jinnah Papers. p. 228.
Annex to PS-133, Paul H. Alling to George Marshall, US National Archives, F85.00/3-2348, March 23, 1948, Jinnah Papers, p. 229.
Ibid. p. 230.
PS-134 to PS-140 Correspondence between M.A. Jinnah and the ruler of Las Bela, Jinnah Papers, pp. 235-239.
PS-141, Ruler of Las Bela to M. A. Jinnah, F.20-GG/5-6, Jinnah Papers, p. 240.
POL.1067/48 Copy Telegram, Secretary of State for Commonwealth
Relations, Whitehall, London to Foreign Minister, Kalat. Addressed Sir
Zafrullah Khan Lake Success. LP&S/13/1847.
Inward Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office from UK High Commissioner in Pakistan, March 20, 1948.
Telegram No. 227, March 8, Kalat, LP&S/13/1847.
Inward Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office, POL. 1068/48, From UK High Commissioner in Pakistan, LP&S/13/1847.
British Kalat File, Khan’s Protest to Pakistan, March 21, 1948..
Reuters, India and Pakistan Service, Karachi, March 28, LP&S/13/1847.
Inward Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office, from UK High Commissioner in Pakistan, March 27, 1948, POL. 1096/48.
Monthly appreciation (Pakistan), July 1948, part of POL.10030/48.
Selig Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baluch Nationalism
and Soviet Temptations, Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, pp. 24-25.
Source :
The Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad.
