Sunday, November 29, 2009

The Afghan-Pakistani border is a settled issue.

About twenty-three miles south of Pillar XII, which is erected on the Saricol range of Pamir, lies the beginning of the “North West Frontier”. Pillar XII is located at latitude 37o20′5″N and longitude 74o24′50″E. It was erected by a joint Anglo-Russian Commission in September 1895, on the left bank of a tributary of the Tegermen-Su river, one mile from its mouth; and it is the last among pillars, which carry the Russo-Afghan frontier from the eastern end of Lake Victoria (Wood’s Lake) to the Chinese frontier. 
 
The protocol embodying the final agreement was signed on July 22, 1887 and is known as the Pamir Agreement. The demarcated boundary according to the ‘The Pamir Agreement’ remains unchanged to this day. This border was internationally recognized as the border between the former Soviet Union and Afghanistan. Today this boundary is the internationally recognized border between the Central Asian countries (former Soviet republics as successor independent states of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan) and Afghanistan. 
 
The Afghan frontier turns west from Pillar XII and follows the northern ridge of the Sarikol Range bordering the Taghdumbash Pamir. It then curves southward over the Wakhjir Pass to join the present Pakistan-Afghan frontier, which is often referred to as the Durand line. While negotiating the Durand Line, Amir Abdul Rahman Khan of Afghanistan had received a British mission in a formal Durbar which was held in November 1893, in the Salam Khana Hall, where the civil and military officers of Kabul and chiefs of various tribes were present. 
 
The Amir in his speech gave an outline to the audience of all the understanding which had been agreed upon and the provisions which had been signed, and urged upon them the necessity for adhering firmly to British alliance. He pointed out that the interests of Afghanistan and England were identical. 
 
The Amir further told the audience that it was for the first time that Afghanistan had a definite frontier which would prevent future misunderstandings and would render Afghanistan strong and powerful after it had been consolidated with the aid in arms and ammunition which would be received from the British.
The demarcation of the Durand Line was carried out in fulfillment of the Anglo-Afghan agreement’ of November 12, 1893 between Amir Abdul Rahman Khan of Afghanistan and Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, Foreign Secretary to the Government of the British Raj (the former British colony in South Asia now composed of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh). 
 
The demarcation of the Indo-Afghan frontier, as defined in the above mentioned agreement, was divided into sections and was carried out for the most part by the joint Anglo-Afghan Commission during the year 1894-1896. In 1947, the Indian sub-continent emerged as two independent dominions of India and Pakistan. West Pakistan by right of its location inherited the former North West Frontier of British India and the Indo-Afghan boundary established vide the agreement of 1893. 
 
There are some circles who continue to spread disinformation that the agreement was signed under duress and has a validity of 100 years. Unfortunately, the propaganda emanates from a country in the neighborhood of Pakistan. This country also instigates anti-Pakistan elements in the Afghan government to issue controversial statements undermining Pak-Afghan relations. A host of websites of this country also disseminate anti-Pakistan propaganda. It is therefore necessary to put the facts in the correct perspective as follows: 
 
– The International Border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is based on the map attached with the original Agreement of 1893. 
 
– Clause 6 of the Agreement clearly states that the agreement is regarded by both the parties as a full and satisfactory settlement of all the principal differences of opinion which have arisen between them. The Agreement has been reaffirmed by successive Afghan rulers. 
 
– 1905 Treaty with Amir Habibullah Khan continuing the Agreements which had existed between the British Government and Amir Abdul Rahman Khan. Para 2 states “I also have acted, am acting and will act upon the same agreement and I will not contravene them in any dealing or in any promise.” 
 
– Treaty of peace between the British Government and the Independent Afghan Government concluded at Rawalpindi on 8th August 1919. Article 5 states that “the Afghan Government accepts the Indo-Afghan frontier accepted by the Late Amir.” 
 
– Friendly and Commercial Relations treaty between Great Britain and Afghanistan at Kabul on 22 November 1921. Article 2 of the treaty states that, “The two high contracting parties accept the Indo-Afghan frontier as accepted by the Afghan Government under Article V of the treaty concluded at Rawalpindi on 8th August 1919.” 
 
– Notes were exchanged between His Majesty’s Government and Afghan Minister in London, 1930 (His Highness General Shah Wali Khan to Mr. Arthur Henderson), Afghan Legation 6th May 1930. Both parties ~greed that it was their understanding that the Treaty of Kabul of 22 November 1921 continued to have full force and effect. 
 
– On 13 June 1948, Shah Wali Khan, the Afghan envoy to Pakistan declared, ” Our King has already stated, and I, as the representative of Afghanistan, declare that Afghanistan has no claims on frontier territory and even if there were any, they have been given up in favour of Pakistan. Anything contrary to this which may have appeared in the press in the past or may appear in the future should not be given credence at all and should be considered just a canard.”
 
The Pak-Afghan International Border has sound technical and legal background. According to international law, treaties of the extinct state concerning boundary lines remain valid and all rights and duties arising from such treaties of the extinct state devolve on the absorbing state. Pakistan is a successor state of British India. The following is worth mentioning: 
 
– A country to country treaty does not need any revision unless both parties desire change. 
 
– International Agreement once finally concluded can be revoked only bilaterally and not unilaterally. 
 
– Unless otherwise provided in the concluded treaty about its duration, the treaty becomes of a permanent nature. This is applicable to the 1893 Treaty Agreement. 
 
– International Law does not lay down the maximum life period of one hundred years for an internationally concluded border agreement between the two states, when fixed border validity has not been mentioned in its text. 
 
It goes beyond doubt to say that the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is a settled matter and is globally accepted. It is supported by International Law and the treaty of 1893 has been ratified several times by successive Afghan governments. 
 
Durand Line / Treaty
As long as Afghanistan refuses to accept the Durand Line as the permanent international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan, there is no reliable way to combat extremism and terrorism in the region. 
 
Durand Line – the present border between Afghanistan and Pakistan – was agreed to as official boundary line between the British Raj and Afghanistan on 12 November 1893. Sir Henry Mortimer Durand from the British side and Amir Abdul Rahman Khan from the Afghan side signed the historical document.
Pakistan and Afghanistan, as successor states, are bound to honor this agreement.
 
The present spread of religious intolerance and extremism in the region is, in great part, attributable to the fact that the successive and successor governments of Afghanistan have declined to accept the Durand Line as permanent boundary between the two countries. Uncertainty of the boundary rules and impermanent nature of the physical border are playing in favour of extremist elements on both sides of the dividing line. 
 
Moreover, there was a whisper campaign a while ago that the Durand Line agreement was valid for 100 years and after that the document is legally null and void now. The original text shows that there is no time-expiry clause in the agreement. 
 
Here is the complete text of the agreement:
Agreement
between
His Highness Amir Abdul Rahman Khan, G.C.E.I
Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies, on the one part,
and
Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.,
Foreign Secretary to the Government of India,
representing the Government of India, on the other part
Whereas certain questions have arisen regarding the frontier of Afghanistan on the side of India, and whereas both His Highness the Amir and the Government of India are desirous of settling these questions by a friendly understanding, and of fixing the limit of their respective spheres of influence, so that for the future there may be no difference of opinion on the subject between the allied Governments, it is hereby agree as follows:
 
1. The eastern and southern frontier of High Highness’s dominions, from Wakhan to the Persian border, shall follow the line shown in the map attached to this agreement.
 
2. The Government of British India will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan, and His Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of India.
 
3. The British Government thus agrees to His Highness the Amir retaining Asmar and the valley above it, as far as Chanak. His Highness agrees on the other hand that he will at no time exercise interference in Swat, Bajaur or Chitral, including the Arnawai or Bashgal valley. The British Government also agrees to leave to His Highness the Birmal tract as shown in the detailed map already given to High Highness, who relinquishes his claim to the rest of the Waziri country and Dawar. His Highness also relinquishes his claim to Chageh [now, Chagai. Ed.].
 
4. The frontier line will hereafter be laid down in detail and demarcated, wherever this may be practicable and desirable, by Joint British and Afghan Commissioners, whose object will be to arrive by mutual understanding at a boundary which shall adhere with the greatest possible exactness to the line shown in the map attached to this agreement, having due regard to the existing local rights of villages adjoining the frontier.
 
5. With reference to the question of Chaman, the Amir withdraws his objection to the new British Cantonment and concedes to the British Government the rights purchased by him in the Sirkai-Tilerai water. At this part of the frontier, the line will be drawn as follows: 
 
From the crest of Khwaja Amran range near the Pasha Kotal, which remains in British territory, the line will run in such a direction as to leave Murgha Chaman and the Sharobo spring to Afghanistan, and to pass half way between the New Chaman Fort and the Afghan outpost known locally as Lashkar Dand. The line will then pass half way between the railway station and the hill known as the Mian Baldak, and, turning southwards, will rejoin the Khwaja Arman range, leaving the Gwasha Post in British territory, and the road to Shorawak to the west and south of Gwasha in Afghanistan. The British Government will not exercise any interference within half a mile of the road. 
 
6. The above articles of agreement are regarded by the government of British India and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan as a full and satisfactory settlement of all the principal differences of opinion which have arisen between them in regard to the frontier; and both the Government of British India and His Highness the Amir undertake that any differences of detail, such as those which will have to be considered hereafter by the officers appointed to demarcate the boundary line, shall be settled in a friendly spirit, so as to remove for the future as far as possible all causes of doubt and misunderstanding between the two Governments. 
 
7. Being fully satisfied of His Highness’s good-will to the British Government, and wishing to see Afghanistan independent and strong, the Government of British India will raise no objection to the purchase and import by His Highness of munitions of war, and they will themselves grant him some help in this respect. Further, in order to mark their sense of the friendly spirit in which High Highness the Amir has entered into these negotiations, the Government of British India undertake to increase by the sum of six lakhs of rupees a year the subsidy of twelve lakhs now granted to His Highness.
(Signed) H. M. Durand
(Signed) Amir Abdul Rahman Khan
Kabul, the 12th November 1893
Note: Original agreement is available in the national archive of Pakistan. This report has been produced from the copy available at the Area Study Center, Peshawar University.
Published with permission.
One Lakh = 100000 
 
Views on the issue of Pak-Afghan border:
 
– Following independence, the NWFP voted to join Pakistan in a referendum in 1947. However, Afghanistan’s loya jirga of 1949 declared the Durand Line invalid as they saw it as ex patre on their side since British India ceased to exist in 1947 with the independence of Pakistan and the Republic of India. This had no tangible effect as there has never been a move to enforce such a declaration. Additionally, world courts have universally upheld uti possidetis juris, i.e, binding bilateral agreements with or between colonial powers are “passed down” to successor independent states, as with most of Africa. A unilateral declaration by one party has no effect; boundary changes must be made bilaterally. Thus, the Durand Line boundary remains in effect today as the international boundary and is recognized as such by nearly all nations. Despite pervasive internet rumors to the contrary, U.S. Dept. of State and the British Foreign Commonwealth Office documents and spokespersons have recently confirmed that the Durand Line, like virtually all international boundaries, has no expiration date, nor is their any mention of such in any Durand Line documents. The 1921 treaty expiration refers only to the 1921 agreements.
 
– Afghanistan was created in 1747 AD by the Punjab-born (city of Multan in present-day Pakistan) Pashtun named Ahmed Shah Abdali. The fact is Abdali conquered the Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkmens, Balochis, Punjabis, etc. This was a forceful occupation of various lands/peoples subdued to the Abdali monarchy. Per Encyclopedia Britannica, “Ahmad Shah began by capturing Ghazni from the Ghilzai Pashtuns, and then wresting Kabul from the local ruler. In 1749 the Mughal ruler ceded sovereignty over Sindh Province and the areas west of the Indus River to Ahmad Shah in order to save his capital from Afghan attack. Ahmad Shah then set out westward to take possession of Herat, which was ruled by Nadir Shah’s grandson, Shah Rukh. Herat fell to Ahmad after almost a year of siege and bloody conflict, as did Mashhad in present-day Iran. Ahmad next sent an army to subdue the areas north of the Hindu Kush. In short order, the powerful army brought under its control the Turkmen, Uzbek, Tajik, and Hazara tribes”. 
 
– Now many people can argue that Afghanistan’s creation was illegal because the land belonged to Persian-based Safavids/Sassanians/etc and South Asian-based Mughals/Mauryas/etc until Abdali’s creation in 1747 AD. But the fact of the matter is people and its lands constantly evolve to new geo-political environments changing boundaries and nation-hoods. Prior to 1747 AD, the region of Afghanistan was ruled by Persian Achaemenians and Sassanians, Greeks, Scythians, Hepthalites, Arabs, Turkics, Mongols, and many others. 
 
Most recently it was controlled by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) until 2021 AD.
 
Mauryas and Mughals ruled a large portion of present-day Afghanistan (almost all of Pashtun areas). By the way, the Muslim rulers of South Asia were mostly Turko-Mongols originating from Central Asia who also ruled the Pashtuns. 
 
– Afghanistan’s creation was legal in the same way Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, etc. were created later on. The boundaries between Iran and Afghanistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan/Uzbekistan/Turkmenistan, etc were created by the British and Russians. So the few Afghans beating the drum of Durand Line (Pak-Afghan boundary) is pointless. By the same token, all boundaries of Afghanistan are questionable. Why should only Pashtun areas of Pakistan be merged to Afghanistan? Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic country like Pakistan. Should Tajikistan lay claim to Tajik lands of Afghanistan, Uzbekistan to Uzbek lands in Afghanistan, Turkmenistan to Turkmen lands in Afghanistan, etc.? 
 
– The mostly ethnicity-based countries like Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, & Turkmenistan have much more stronger claims to Tajik, Turkmen, & Uzbek lands of Afghanistan because Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic country like Pakistan, so a multi-ethnic Afghanistan has no right to claim only Pashtun lands of Pakistan. How about Pakistan claiming Pashtun lands of Afghanistan instead since Pashtuns are being oppressed in Afghanistan, Pashtuns in Pakistan are comparatively much more prosperous, and Afghans are desperate to flee to Pakistan. 
 
By the way, Pashtuns are not the only ethnic group divided between two countries, e.g. Azeris are divided between Iran and Azerbaijan, Tajiks between Afghanistan and Tajikistan, Uzbeks between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, Turkmens between Afghanistan and Turkmenistan, Balochis between Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, Kurds between Iran, Turkey, Iraq and Syria, Arabs between many different countries, Bengalis between Bangladesh and India etc. 
 
– If Durand Line of boundary is artificial then how valid are the boundaries between Afghanistan and Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, etc…. or all countries of Middle East (Sykes-Picot treaty).. created by former European colonialists such as the British, French, and Russians. Lets not forget the “Great Game” on how the Brits and Ruskies created Afghanistan’s boundaries as a buffer zone between them. We know how the Soviets created Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan… “In 1886 a Russian army fresh from its conquest of the Oasis of Merv, in today’s Turkmenistan, occupied the Panjdeh Oasis near Herat.
 
 It was also the time of The first Great Game. Britain immediately warned Russia that any further advance towards Herat would be considered as inimical to British interests. As a consequence of the May 1879 Treaty of Gandamak after the Second Afghan War, Britain took control of Afghanistan’s foreign affairs. After the Panjdeh incident a joint Anglo-Russian boundary commission, without any Afghan participation, fixed the Afghan border with Turkestan, which was the whole of Russian Central Asia, now Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (though Tajikistan being part of Turkestan is questionable since Tajikistan is not a Turkic-speaking country). 
 
Thus as a consequence of the competition between the British and the Russian Empires, a new country, the Afghanistan we know today, was created to serve as the buffer.” …..Now on the Afghan-Iran boundaries created by the British/Russians, according to Encyclopedia Britannica, “In 1863 Dost Mohammad retook Herat from Iran with British acquiescence…. The boundary with modern Iran was firmly delineated in 1904, replacing the ambiguous line made by a British commission in 1872″. 
 
– In 1947 and beyond the Congressite followers of Badshah Khan continued to ask the Gandhi question “The Pathans should have had a choice between Afghanistan, Pakistan and India”. The Muslim League had correctly argued that the British had no right to ask that particular question, since they did not ask Nagaland if it wanted to join Burma, nor did they ask Tamil Nadu if it wanted to join Sri Lanka. Thus the Durand Line became the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
 
– Knowing the bitter enmity between Tajiks/Hazaras and Pashtuns in Afghanistan, Tajiks/Hazaras will never allow Afghanistan to become 75% Pashtun (from 40%) by only integrating Pashtun areas of Pakistan.
 
– The word Afghan in the past might have referred to a Pashtun tribe(s), but that meaning evolved to another one. Today, an Afghan is defined as only a citizen of present-day Afghanistan regardless of ethnicity. There are countless other examples on how a word’s meaning evolves to a different one over time.
 
– NWFP of Pakistan is not all Pashtun, large areas of this land are Hindkowi, Shina, Khowari, Gujjar, etc. most linguistically related to Punjabi. Majority of Balochistan is Baloch who also have bitter rivalry with the Afghans and do not want to be part of Afghanistan. 
 
– Millions of Pakistani Pashtuns inhabit in the provinces of Punjab and Sindh such as cities of Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad… not to mention millions of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Since the 1980s the Durand Line has been a porus line for men and material. During the Soviet occupation of Western/Northern Afghanistan, some portions of Eastern/Southern Afghanistan (at least the Pashtun portions) literally became part of free Afghanistan, a satellite of Pakistan. 6 million Afghans came to Pakistan as refugees. More than one million Afghan children were born in Pakistan. 
 
– Pashtuns have much more in common with Pakistanis than with Afghans plus there are much more Pashtuns in Pakistan than in Afghanistan. Pashtuns are linguistically Indo-Iranic. Linguistically, Pakistanis are 99% Indo-Iranic, whereas Afghans are only 84% Indo-Iranic. Punjabi, Sindhi, Balochi, Koshur,  Lashkari, Pashto, & Dari are all Indo-Iranic languages which means they are related to each other and have a common origin. About 16% of Afghans are linguistically Altaic such as the Uzbeks, Turkmens, etc. These Altaic Afghans are linguistically distinct and unrelated to the Indo-Iranic peoples. Additionally, Pashtuns are racially mostly Caucasoid as the rest of  Pakistanis are also mostly racially Caucasoid (slightly mixed with a little Dravidoid, Mongoloid, Negroid and other few foreign bloodlines). On the other hand, Afghans are only 66% Caucasoid. Hazaras, Turkmens, Uzbeks, (and some Tajiks) etc. are mostly Mongoloid by race.
 
-Despite the Hazaras being linguistically Indo-Iranic, they share a common Altaic background with Uzbeks, Turkmens, Mongolians and other racially Altaic peoples.

Sunday, September 13, 2009

Just how 'indiginious' is India's weapons technology?

Indian propagandists over the past decades have been propagating & exaggerating foreign involvement in Pakistani weapons projects (including nuclear) while staying silent and working to cover-up any foreign involvement in their own weapons programs.

They have done a fairly good job at it, because now days it's very difficult to dig out sources which point towards serious Soviet involvement in India's nuclear weapons program; hence the Indians have been able to portray it as 'indigenous' along with other hi-tech weaponry they possess.

They have launched this propaganda all over the Internet including wikipedia, or quoting their self-proclaimed "analysts" like the person who goes under the name B. Raman who has a favorite past time in spreading and exaggerating the weaknesses of Pakistani military tech.

Not only have they been very successful at deliberately exaggerating/falsifying foreign assistance to Pakistani weapons programs, but also it appears they have even imported foreign weaponry and simply given an Indian name to it to make it look 'indigenous', without having any involvement in it's construction at all!

Additionally, they have been on a propaganda campaign to claim success in alot of their tested weaponry and missiles, when most of them have miserably failed. The videos posted below proves the failure about Indian missiles along with other "indigenous" equipment allegedly made by India when some of them appear to be exact duplicates of European military equipment. Can this be a coincidence, or simply imported equipment with an India tag labeled to it?

The videos below contain direct statements from Indian "scientists" & "engineers" as well as clear coverage from the Indian media.

Indians who also whine and cry about Pakistan being crushed in another Indo-Pak war without alliance to America or China or other countries, should know a few things.

1) The first Indo-Pak war took place in 1947, before China and Pakistan forged an alliance. India on the other hand was already allied with the USSR and also the British had left most of their military equipment with India than Pakistan at the time of their departure from the subcontinent. Despite all this plus the larger size of the Indian military, they were unable to take all of Kashmir away from Pakistan.

2) Another full scale war will involve nuclear weapons, which will be enough to destroy BOTH countries. Additionally because India is much more densely populated than Pakistan, more people in India will suffer/die in the event of nuclear exchanges between both countries.

3) Those who rejoice in the 1971 war, already know it was an unjust fight. The Pakistani military was at civil war and a thousand miles within enemy territory.
It would be no different for Pakistan to enter East Punjab during the Khalistan movement uprising and aiding Sikh separatists or attacking India during a full scale civil war and then boasting 'victory.'
Conclusion: 1971 war doesn't really count since it was not a straight one-on-one war.

Below are the videos mentioned in this article and here are some rare sources on the aid given by the Soviet Union & Israel to India's "indigenous" nuclear weapons and other weapons programs:
http://www.expressindia.com/news/fullstory.php?newsid=18265
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/india/bmd.htm

http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=61





Thursday, September 3, 2009

There was no 'partition' of "India"

THERE WAS NO “PARTITION”: For Britain ” ‘Indian’ Empire” included Somalia, Iraq, Burma, Singapore etc. For the French “India” included Vietnam (Indo-China). For the Dutch “India” included “Indo-n-asia”. Some truly educated historians and many educated Pakistanis in particular take deep umbrage and dislike the usage of the term “partition” because “partition” implies the division of a whole. As the maps show, the term “India” was very ephemeral and put in vogue by the British. Before British times, there was no such word. Because there never was a country called “India” there was no "partition"
“India is no more a country than the Equator“ Winston Churchill Initially when Lord Clive of the East Indian company defeated Shirijud Daulah, he called it British Bengal. When the British formally came to the Subcontinent in 1857, they encountered more than 570 states. When they left the Subcontinent they left more than 570 independent states and two dominions, India and Pakistan. The states on the banks of the Indus decided to live together as Pakistan, as they had lived together for thousands of years. The states on the Gangetic plain banded together to form “Bharat”. The state on the Brahamaputra became its own state. Maps showing various sovereign, independent states in the Subcontinent during the British Raj:
Each state had its own currency, laws, jails, flag, crest, passport, military, treasury, and British forces were not allowed to enter the state. Many were ruled by Muslims rulers like Hydrabad, Bhopal, Junagarh etc. Maps showing various sovereign, independent states in the Subcontinent during the British Raj.
The separation of Burma is not called “partition”. The independence of Sri Lanka is not called “partition”. the removal of Iraq from the British Indian Empire is not called “partition”. The independence of Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan is not called “partition”. Aden and Somalia becmae independent in the British Indian Empire and are not lamented as being “partitioned” off. For the French, sperating Vietnam from their Indian Empire is not called “partition”. For the Dutch, removing Indonesia from Dutch “India” is not called separation.
The Western states had lived together in the Valley of the Indus for more than 5000 years together so it was natural for them to live together
THE BASIS FOR THE THESIS “Pakistan” existed 5000 years ago. 5000 years ago Pakistan was probably not called “Pakistan”. China 5000 years ago was also called something else. Egypt 5000 years ago was called something else.
Kushan Parthian maps show different parts of the world.
The British Indian Empire included Somalia, Iraq, Aden, Burma and other states. Then there was the French “Indian” Empire, Dutch “Indian” Empire, “Portuguese” Indian Empire and even a Dansih “Indian” Empire. Each one had a different meaning of “India”.The French “Indian” Empire included Vietnam etc. The Dutch Indian Empire included parts of the Subcontinent and Indonesia. Columbus called America “India” and the local inhabitants Indian. Other islands in the new world were called East Indies. South East Asia was called Indo-China The French “Indian” Empire included parts of the Subcontinent and (Indo-China) Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos in it

The Dutch “Indian” Empire included Indonesia in it

Portugese map shows. Notice Pakistan labelled Sindh and "India" as Hind. Also note that the name "Hind" is derived from Sindh. So yes, even the roots of the words "Hind" "Hindi" "Hindu" "Hindustan" all originate in present-day Pakistan. These words are a result of the corruption of the original name "Sindu" meaning land of the rivers which was Pakistan's name in 3000 BC. Independent princely states during 17th century British presence:
Map of Timur's empire, which included Pakistan, but not "India"
THERE WAS NO PARTITION The Pakistan proposal “Now or Never” was not based on any partition. It was based on the Muslim majority areas coming together.
 
Countless maps of pre-47 Pakistan can be found including different time eras most of them excluding present-day "India" 
 
“Notwithstanding [a] thousand years of close contact, nationalities which are as divergent today as ever, cannot at any time be expected to transform themselves into one nation merely by means of subjecting them to a democratic constitution and holding them forcibly together by unnatural and artificial methods of British Parliamentary statutes. 
 
What the unitary government of India for one hundred fifty years had failed to achieve cannot be realized by the imposition of a central federal government. It is inconceivable that the fiat or the writ of a government so constituted can ever command a willing and loyal obedience throughout the sub-continent by various nationalities, except by means of armed force behind it. Quaid E Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Founder of modern-day Pakistan and the Father of the state.
 
THE PROOF OF THE THESIS How could a country be partitioned from "India" when it has existed for more than 5000 years as a separate entity. One hundred and Fifty years as part of the British empire does not make “India” a country.
 
Pakistanis and historians detest the word that incorrectly describes the genesis of the country that has existed since time immemorial.
 
So why do people believe this whole falsified term "partition of 'Inida'" Indians have been involved in a massive propaganda campeign for the past 60 years including making movies, writing books, articles, propmoting historic distorsion.
 
Hitler had a saying. Speak a lie, keep repeating it and everyone will believe it. 
 
The term “india” stems from the Arab usage of the word Hind from for the inhabitants who lived on the Sindhu (Indus) river. From Sindh to Hindh. In time all residents beyond the Indus were also called Hindus.
The Western states, Kalat, Bhawalpur, and provinces Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan, and NWFP banded together to form “Pakistan” and decided to live together as one country just like they had lived together for thousands of years before the British arrived in the Indus Valley Civilization that existed almost entirely on the banks of the Indus. The states of the Gangetic Civilization that existed on the banks of the Ganges banded together to live form Bharat(constitutional name of “India”). Pakistan had objected to the name “India” being used by Bharat. 
 
These maps show the British Indian Empire which included many states. The other maps detail the condition of the Subcontinent on the eve of the British departure.There never was a country called “India.” The Arabs never ventured past Sindh. The nomenclature was for those on the river Indus as Sindhu or Hindu. ”India” is a colonial derivative of the word. During British Times vast areas of Asia came under the jurisdiction of Britain. 
 
Iraq, Somalia, Burma and 526 states in the Subcontinent were all part of the British Empire. When the British were leaving all the parts were made independent.Of these, Somalia, Iraq, Burma, and Pakistan are some of the countries that got liberated. There never was any partition because there never was a “whole” to divide. At one point Afghanistan was also part of the British "Indian" Empire. Curzon’s retreat from Afghanistan, and its separation from the “Indian” Empire was not called “partition”. 
 
The separation of Iraq from the Indian empire was not called partition. The separation of Aden from British India was not called partition. the separation of the gulf states from “India” was not called partition. The independence of Burma from the British raj in 1933 was not called “partition”. Why is the Pakistani independence called “partition”, as if it was part and parcel of a “whole”.
 
THE FOUR SUPERPOWERS OF EARLY HISTORY: China, Egypt, Iraq and Pakistan. The Nile, the Tigris-Euphrates delta, the Yangtze Delta, and the Indus, are the wombs of all civilizations on our earth. These river valley spawned and nurtured humanity. Imagine a world with four superpowers at peace with each other. Imagine a planet where each civilization was immersed in humongous construction projects, urban edification and trade. . How did these proto-world powers interact with each other? Imagine a civilization without any implements of war. Let us look into pre-history and peek into the “seeds” of time. Let us look at the valleys of the world that engendered the Superpowers of the ancient world.
 
PAKISTAN 5000 YEARS AGO:-The Indus Valley Civilization of South Asia was one of the inceptive civilizations on the planet. It was contemporaneous with the Chinese, Egyptian, and Sumerian civilizations. These were the times when the Egyptians were building huge monuments to their God-kings,the pyramids and the Sphinx. These were the centuries when the Chinese were building palaces for the Shun dynasty. These were exciting eons in the Holy lands too. 
 
These were the centuries when Moses was battling the pharaohs, Abraham was building the Kaaba, David was ruling the kingdom, and Solomon was building the Temple of Yahweh. It was during these centuries that the Indus Valley Civilization flourished and reached its zenith in South Asia. 
 
The IVC built well planned municipalities for its citizens. While the Egyptians spent three generations of their labor force (estimated between 20,000-10000) building useless mausoleum-pyramids to bury the God-kings, the Harappans were successful in eradicating, disease, hunger, and malnutrition. The Harappans of the IVC did not build huge commemorative, deifying, dedicatory, cenotaphs. The Harappans of Meluhha-IVC built the finest cities of the third millennium BCE. 
 
Because the Subcontinent was never “one” country, there are deep fissures in “Bharat.” The Kashmiris, the Naxalites, the Northeastern states, as well as East Punjab, and Tamil Nadu on the South all want to revert to the pre-1947 era. 
 

 

Pan-Indo-Iranism might be the only nationalistic ideology to re-unite Pakistanis outside of religion.

Perhaps the only way to redraw Pakistani nationalism is by spreading Pan-Indo-Iranism or at least base it on a common Indo-Iranic identity. Let us provide a background on Indo-Iranic peoples. Up to to 99% of Pakistanis speak an Indo-Iranic language as their mother tongue.There are about two dozen languages spoken in Pakistan, still 99% of them are Indo-Iranic. The Indo-Iranic language family can be broken down into four subgroupings. Linguists sometimes say three or even two, but we'll mention all four anyway. Indo-Aryan- the main ones in Pakistan are Sindhi & Punjabi and ofcourse Lashkari. 

Iranic-The main ones in Pakistan are Balochi & Pashto Dardic-The main one in Pakistan is Kashmiri Nuristani-Another assumed subfamily of Indo-Iranic but spoken in north eastern Afghanistan, not Pakistan. Indo-Iranic speaking people do not necessarily form a common race, but inside Pakistan they do to a very high degree. 

Almost all of Pakistan's population belong to haplogroup R1A. If a person were to search for the distribution of haplogroup R1A on the world map, it covers almost entirely all of Pakistan. Indo-Iranic peoples as a language group includes peoples of non-Indo-Iranic origins as well. For example the Hazaras of Afghanistan are mostly Mongoloids, belonging to haplogroup Q, but today they speak an Iranic language Dari. This does not automatically put them into the Indo-Iranic family or automatically place them into haplogroup R1A or any sub-group of haplogroup R for that matter. 

Rather it places them into the Indo-Iranic language group, which would exclude them from Pan-Indo-Iranic ideologies or movements. Besides the Hazaras maintain their Turko-Mongol culture & identity even today. The Kurdish language is also Iranic but Kurds are said to be actually mostly of Arab descent but switched to an Iranic language due to being ruled by ancient Iranic-speaking people. 

This would put most Kurds into haplogroup J1. (a subgrouping of haplogroup J) Coming to Pakistan, Indo-Iranic speaking people in Pakistan do have more in common beyond just linguistics. As our previous article(s) stated Pakistan has a high frequency of R1A gene markers. Kashmiris have it the most Pashtuns are also amongst the higher carriers. Plus all of Pakistan's Indo-Iranic population is Caucasoid. A clear case of common ancestry in almost the entire populations. 

In Iran, India, Afghanistan, Iraq you have different peoples from different language families belonging to different genetic haplogroups as well. So it is good to believe a common Indo-Iranic identity is what can unite & define us. Pashtuns it is said believe are the closest genetic relatives of populations living inside Kashmir. This can give us a strong claim over Kashmir's population, even outside of religion. Even Kashmiris also don't relate themselves with Indians racially or culturally. Even though Indo-Iranic speakers spread all the way to Bangladesh, they don't share common genetics. 

Even though we are commonly compared to North Indians, their R1A percentage is still lower and it would drop significantly if they let go of Kashmir. Indian Brahmins have alot of it but alot of sources state that they fall into haplogroup R2 which is still in haplogroup R, but very distantly related to R1 by generations. People in Pakistan belonging to haplogroup R1 are even closer to Europeans than to the R2 careers in India. Plus it's still a minority of people living in a small portion of Northwestern India. Our main point is, spreading pan-Indo-Iranism wont mean having to unite with Indians & Iranians and other Indo-Iranic speaking peoples. A main highlight of Pan-Indo-Iranism would be the common R1A haplogroup (and a little R1B in the north western areas), pointing to a common ancestor(s) of just about every ethnic group in Pakistan. 

And ofcourse common linguistics & culture. There's a good chance that there are still remainders of proto-Indo-Iranic culture & mythology today in Pakistan, such as the endangered Kalash who still practice it or at least a form of it. There are many books on Indo-Iranic peoples. But what is Pakistanis opinion on our Indo-Iranic identity? Surely, we do not speak a common language in Pakistan today (most countries in the world are multilingual anyway), we do not have 100% the same culture today in Pakistan, but rather closely related cultures & languages. 

So how else do we draw out our identity if not for a common Indo-Iranic identity? What else do we have in common besides this? Religion is another, but the problem is not all Pakistanis have the same religion, and even the Muslim majority is divided into sects which has caused a lot of violent friction amongst the population. Readers who are unfamiliar with the subject of Indo-Iranic peoples can find further information on the site linked: http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Indo-Iranians#encyclopedia Though the term Iranic is regularly called Iranian, Iranic is the more correct and accurate term. Iranian today refers to a person from present-day Iran whereas Iranic refers to the language family (and sometimes racial & cultural, if the speakers of the Indo-Iranic tongue belong to a common haplogroup of R1A).

Wednesday, July 29, 2009

Pakistanis are NOT "indians":There is no such thing as the "South Asian race" or "brown race" or "desi race"

NOTE: THIS POST IS NOT YET COMPLETED

The Indian propaganda machine has alot of pseudoscience supporting it's favor. This pseudoscience can be on many lines weather historic distortion, science (genetics in this case) or other political propaganda to erase the identity of other South Asian nations and discredit them while Indians credit themselves.

Many Pan-South Asian Indian propagandists and their partners in Bangladesh, Pakistan like to propagate the people of South Asia as being "one race."

Sometimes this imaginary 'race' is laughably called the "brown race" sometimes it's called the "desi race" and perhaps a laundry list of names are underway for this imaginary 'race.'

Their method of spreading their propaganda is very easy and it follows Adolph Hitlers strategy of speak a lie, keep repeating it and everyone will believe it.

This is exactly how the Indian/Hindutva propaganda feeds itself aside from using misleading terminology or deliberately misquoting scholars to fit their own political agendas.

Coming back to the subject of genetics where Pan-South Asian Indian propagandists and Hindutvas have tried to convince the world that Nepalis, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and others don't exist as a race and are just part of the "Indian race" or the "South Asian" race and carry the same genes.

Using actual haplogroup reports of Y-Chromosomes & mtDNA in Southern Asia let us examine how true their claims are.
Some readers might not have a clue on genetics, so before we proceed, we should clarify a bit of basic genetic terminology as follows below:

-Y-chrosome(s)=Genes passed on from father to son. A male individual's maternal linage cannot be traced using Y-chromosomes as it's strictly based on a father-to-son linage.

-mt DNA= Genes passed on from mother to daughter. If a female human were to determine her fathers ancestry, she'd need Y-chromosome samples which she can only obtain from a brother, an uncle or another close male relative. Since females do not posses Y-chromosomes, it cannot be used to determine a father-to-daughter genetic linage.

Some major genetic Haplogroup in the world: (these can also be broken down into sub markers)

-R1A=Mostly Eastern European though also in very high percentages in western European countries as well as most of South-Central Asia. Some sources state it arose somewhere around the Black Sea and the Caucasus region (although many Indian propagandists & pseuodoscientists claim it to be of Indian origin based on their fantasy "out of India" theory). Dominant in Pakistan, eastern Afghanistan, high in Iran as well as North Western India

-J1= Haplogroup of Semitic people whom are Natives of the Arabian peninsula as well as those who have semitic ancestry in them. A submarker of J. This is not necessarily associated with people who speak Semitic languages.

-J2=Said to have started somewhere in the fertile crescent. Common throughout the Mediterranean people as well as significant markers in India. Also commonly found in people of Ashkenasi Jewish descent, due to the Hebrew origins that many people of Jewish faith have. Also a submarker of J.

-E3B2=Indigenous to most north African people, again regardless of linguistic association.

-R1B=Western European, but also found in Anatolia (Turkey) , modern-day Iran, and other parts of Europe due to migrations and expansion of Empires on both sides of Eurasia. (ie. Ottoman Empire in the Balkans caused mixing between Turks & Native Balkans.)

-L=Haplogroup most strongest throughout India thought to be of the Native population. Some sources indicate that it is a result of a mutation that took place by it's careers somewhere in north-central India.
Can also be broken down into sub markers as named below and linking site.

-E3A=Subsaharran African.

-A=Also another Subsaharran African.

-Q=Turkic/Mongoloid/Turanoid. Not found in all Turkic speaking peoples as per the general consensus that language<< >>genetics.
Q is also found amongst certain Native North American tribes, coinciding with theories & linguistic findings that some Native American tribes crossed over from North Eastern Asia into North America via Alska sometime around the Ice Age.

First let's look at haplogroup native & exclusive to India (including those of Indian descent living outside of India)

Below is a haplogroup map of the Indian genetic marker L and it's locations obtained from
http://www.genebase.com/tutorial/item.php?tuId=13


The site gives additional details into marker L, it's distributions and it's divisions into L*, L1, L2, L1A, L2B, L3*, L3A.




As clearly shown marker L (represented in black) mostly widespread in India and not Pakistan. It is only in Southern Pakistan represented by Mohajirs, Brahuis and other language groups primarily or partially of Indian descent. In the early years of independence Pakistan experienced a massive wave of Muslim immigrants migrating from North India and other parts of the subcontinent.

L is also present in other parts of the world due to migration of tribes originating in present-day India.

Take for example the presence of the L marker in Europe. This is due to the migration of Romany people (also known as Gypsies) from India into Europe.

This is one proof that Indians and Pakistanis are not "the same" weather demographically or genetically. There are some shared markers, due to India and Pakistan having common invaders such as the Mughals/Mongols leaving behind their markers in both countries.

Another thing to note is that the above map points out the marker L also appears to be absent in Bangladesh and Nepal, given that Indians also love hijacking Bangladeshi identity, culture & literature to elevate 'their' achievements or claiming Nepalese history as one of theirs too.

Markers common to India & Pakistan and reasons for this commanlity.

Aside from R1A, most genetic markers common to certain parts of India and Pakistan is due to race mixing between a common invader.

R1A is a gene shared by Pakistan and North Western India due to migrations of early Indo-European speaking tribes that are said to have arrived into the subcontinent, through Pakistan and went across into North western India in ancient times. Their expansion stopped right there, which explains the limit of R1A in northwestern India. Indeed, most of Northwest Indians are a blend of these Indo-Aryan speakers alongside Native Dravidian speakers and others.

A brief quote form the CIA world fact book on India's background:
"Aryan tribes from the northwest infiltrated onto the Indian subcontinent about
1500 B.C.; their merger with the earlier Dravidian inhabitants created the
classical Indian culture."

The map below shows the most significant presence of R1A (represented in purple, while the black non-R1 markers) throught Pakistan while limited only to Northwestern India:








Another common marker shared by certain Indians & Pakistanis is marker Q, though not very significant. It is hardly visible in both countries. It is again not due to a propagated 'common origin' of "Indians" and Pakistanis but due to historical Turk/Mongoloid/Turanoid invasions of the subcontinent. Most notably are the Huns who were said to be of Turk/Mongoloid origins as well as the Ghaznavids and the Mughals (Mongols), though these two armies had leaders of Iranic speaking backgrounds.

The Q markers distribution in South Asia is seen on the map below also obtained from http://www.genebase.com/tutorial/item.php?tuId=16

The Q haplogroup is represented in black. As stated earlier, only a small percentage of people in India and Pakistan have it.




In India it's about 0.24 while in Pakistan it's about 0.74. Possible reasons for Pakistan having a higher frequency of it is due to Pakistan being the barriar between India & Central Asia and north western Pakistanis having contact with Turko-Mongol armies coming in from central Asia such as Genghis Khan's temporary rule in Balochistan as well as Turkic tribes coming towards North Western Pakistan from Afghanistan. Additionally the White Huns had a strong presence in Pakistan.

More can be learned about Hun rule in pre-Islamic Pakistan here: http://www.geocities.com/pak_history/whitehuns.html

Additionally there is a large Hazara community in Pakistan. The general consensus is that they are descedents of ancient Turko-Mongol tribes that settled in Afghanistan and adopted an iranic language. Their Mongoloid features support these theories.

Haplogroup J1 & 2 are higher in India than in Pakistan. In India it is due to contact between the Portugese & the Arab traders particularly towards the South and surprisingly J seems to be absent almost everywhere in Pakistan save for a small fraction in Balochistan. This is probably due to close historic contact between Balochis and Omanis.









Sunday, July 12, 2009

Hinduism is fiction created by the British

By Pankaj Mishra Author http://souljerky.com/articles/invention_of_hinduism.html THE REMARKABLE quality of this transformation is partly shown by the fact that there was no such thing as Hinduism before the British invented the holdall category in the early nineteenth century, and made India seem the home of a "world religion" as organised and theologically coherent as Christianity and Islam. The concepts of a "world religion" and "religion" as we know them now, emerged during the late 18th and early 19th century, as objects of academic study, at a time of widespread secularisation in western Europe. 

The idea, as inspired by the Enlightenment, was to study religion as a set of beliefs, and to open it up to rational enquiry. But academic study of any kind imposes its own boundaries upon the subject. It actually creates the subject while bringing it within the realm of the intellect. The early European scholars of religion labelled everything; they organised disparate religious practices into one system, and literally brought into being such world religions as Hinduism and Buddhism. Not only Hinduism, but the word Hindu itself is of non-Brahman origin. It was first used by the ancient Persians to refer to the people living near the river Indus (Sindhu in Sanskrit). It then became a convenient shorthand for the Muslim and Christian rulers of India; it defined those who weren't Muslims or Christians. 

Modern scholarship has made available much more information about the castes, religious sects, folk and elite cultures, philosophical traditions and languages that exist, or have existed, on the Indian subcontinent. But despite containing the world's third largest population of Muslims, India is still for most people outside it, a country of Hindus; even a "Hindu civilisation" as it featured in Samuel Huntington's millenarian world-view. The persistence of such labels in the West is not just due to ignorance, or to some lingering Christian fear of unconvertible heathens. 

Perhaps, the urge to fix a single identity for such diverse communities as found in India comes naturally to people in the highly organised and uniform societies of the West, where cultural diversity now usually means the politically expedient and hardened identities of multiculturalism. Perhaps, people who themselves are defined almost exclusively by their citizenship in the nation-state and the consumer society cannot but find wholly alien the pre-modern world of multiple identities and faiths in which most Indians still live. 

Certainly, most Hindus themselves felt little need for precise self-descriptions, except when faced with blunt questions about religion on official forms. Long after their encounter with the monotheistic religions of Islam and Christianity, they continued to define themselves through their overlapping allegiances to family, caste, linguistic group, region, and devotional sect. 

Religion to them was more unselfconscious practice than rigid belief; it is partly why Indian theology accommodates atheism and agnosticism. Their rituals and deities varied greatly, defined often by caste and geography; and they were also flexible: new goddesses continue to enrich the pantheon even today. There is an AIDS goddess which apparently both causes and eradicates the disease. 

At any given time, both snakes and the ultimate reality of the universe were worshipped in the same region, sometimes by the same person. Religion very rarely demanded, as it did with many Muslims or Christians, adherence to a set of theological ideas prescribed by a single prophet, book, or ecclesiastical authority.

This is why a history of Hinduism, no matter how narrowly conceived, has to describe several very parochial-seeming Indian religions, almost none of which contained an evangelical zeal to save the world. The first of these—the Vedic religion—began with the nomads and pastoralists from central Asia who settled north India in the second millennium BC.

 It was primarily created by the priestly class of Brahmans who conducted fire sacrifices with the help of the Vedas, the earliest known Indian scriptures, in order to stave off drought and hunger. But the Brahmans who also formulated the sacred and social codes of the time wished to enhance their own glory and power rather than propose a new all-inclusive faith; they presented themselves as the most superior among the four caste groups that emerged during Vedic times and were based upon racial distinctions between the settlers and the indigenous population of north India and then on a division of labour. 

 A NEW RELIGION WAS also far from the minds of the Buddhists, the Jains and many other philosophical and cultural movements that emerged in the sixth and fifth centuries BC while seeking to challenge the power of the Brahmans and of the caste hierarchy. People dissatisfied with the sacrificial rituals of the Vedic religion later grew attracted to the egalitarian cults of Shiva and Vishnu that became popular in India around the beginning of the first century AD. 

However, the Brahmans managed to preserve their status at the top of an ossifying caste system. They zealously guarded their knowledge of Sanskrit, esoteric texts, and their expertise in such matters as the correct pronunciation of mantras. Their specialised knowledge, and pan-Indian presence, gave them a hold over ruling elites even as the majority of the population followed its own heterodox cults and sects. 

Their influence can be detected in such Indian texts as the Bhagavad-Gita which was interpolated into the much older Mahabharata, and which, though acknowledging the irrelevance of ritual sacrifices, made a life of virtue, or dharma, inseparable from following the rules of caste. At the same time, India remained too big and diverse to be monopolised by any one book or idea. Today, the Hindu nationalists present Muslim rulers of India as the flagbearers of an intolerant monotheism; but there was even more religious plurality during the eight centuries of Muslim presence in India. 

Sufism mingled with local faiths; the currently popular devotional cults of Rama and Krishna, and the network of ashrams and sects expanded fast under the Mughal empire. Medieval India furnishes more evidence of sectarian violence between the worshippers of Shiva and Vishnu than between Hindus and Muslims. In the 18th century, the British were both appalled and fascinated by the excess of gods, sects, and cults they encountered in India.

 It was a religious situation similar to the pagan chaos a Christian from the eastern provinces of the Roman empire might have encountered in the West just before Constantine's conversion to Christianity. As it turned out, like the powerful Christians in Rome, the British in India sought and imposed uniformity. 

There were intellectually curious men among them: a judge called William Jones founded the Asiatic Society of Bengal, whose amateur scholars began in the late 18th century to figure out the strange bewildering country the British found themselves in. Jones, a linguist, confirmed the similarity between Sanskrit and Greek. 

Another official, James Prinsep, deciphered the ancient Indian script of Brahmi, the ancestor of most Indian scripts, that the British found on pillars and rock faces across south Asia, and threw the first clear light on the first great patron of Buddhism, Ashoka. A military officer called Alexander Cunningham excavated the site near Benares where the Buddha had preached his first sermon. 

These days, there is a common enough presumption, which was popularised by Edward Said's Orientalism, that much of western scholarship on the Orient helped, directly or not, western imperialists. Some people take it further and assert that any, or all, western interest in India is tainted with bad faith. IT WOULD BE TOO simple to say that this great intellectual effort, to which we owe much of our present knowledge of India, was part of a colonialist or imperialist enterprise of controlling newly conquered peoples and territories.

 What's more interesting than the by now familiar accusations of Orientalism is how the assumptions of the earliest British scholars mingled with the prejudices of native Indian elites to create an entirely new kind of knowledge about India. These scholars organised their impressions of Indian religion according to what they were familiar with at home: the monotheistic and exclusive nature of Christianity. 

When confronted by diverse Indian religions, they tended to see similarities. These similarities were usually as superficial as those found between Judaism, Christianity and Islam. But the British assumed that different religious practices could only exist within a single overarching tradition. They also started off with a literary bias, which was partly the result of the mass distribution of texts and the consequent high degree of literacy in Europe in the eighteenth century. They thought that since Christianity had canonical texts, Indian tradition must have the same. 

Their local intermediaries tended to be Brahmans, who alone knew the languages—primarily Sanskrit—needed to study such ancient Indian texts as the Vedas and the Bhagavad-Gita. Together, the British scholars and their Brahman interpreters came up with a canon of sorts, mostly Brahmanical literature and ideology, which they began to identify with a single "Hindu religion."

The Brahmanical literature, so systematised, later created much of the appeal of Indian culture for its foreign connoisseurs, such as the German romantics, Schopenhauer, Emerson and Thoreau. The strange fact here is that most Indians then knew nothing or very little of the hymns, invocations and liturgical formulae of the four Vedas or the philosophical idealism of the Upanishads that the British and other European scholars in Europe took to be the very essence of Indian civilisation. 

These Sanskrit texts had long been monopolised by an elite minority of Brahmans who zealously guarded their knowledge of Sanskrit. It was these Brahmans who educated the British amateur scholars. So they studied earnestly the canon of what they supposed to be ancient Indian tradition and managed to remain mostly unaware of the more numerous non-textual, syncretic religious and philosophical traditions of India—for example, the popular devotional cults, Sufi shrines, festivals, rites, and legends that varied across India and formed the worldview of a majority of Indians. But the texts provided the British the standards with which to judge the state of contemporary religion in India. 

Since few Indians at the time seemed capable of the sublime sentiments found in the Bhagavad-Gita and the Rig-Veda, "Hinduism" began to seem a degenerate religion, full of such social evils as widow-burning and untouchability, and in desperate need of social engineering: an idea that appealed both to British colonialists and their Brahman collaborators who had long felt threatened by the non-Brahmanical forms of religion that most Indians followed. 

It was equally convenient to blame the intrusion of Islam into India for Hinduism's fallen state, even the caste system, and to describe Hindus as apathetic slaves of Muslim tyrants: a terrible fate from which the British had apparently rescued them in order to prepare their path to a high stage of civilisation. These ideas about the Muslim tyrants, Hindu slaves and British philanthropists were originally set out in such influential books as History of British India, written by James Mill, a Scottish utilitarian, and the father of John Stuart Mill. Such books now tell you more about the proselytising vigour of some enlightened Scots and utilitarians than about Indian history.

Saturday, July 4, 2009

The confused Pakistani diaspora by Ali Eteraz

This article has been modified from it's original version to avoid misconceptions and inaccuracies but the full credit still goes to the author.

The Pakistani diaspora is significant, around 7 million people, and contributed almost US$8 billion into the economy last year. It is composed by and large of people who only retain a connection to Pakistan via their families. Once the recipients of the remittances pass away, or as is more often the case, themselves leave Pakistan, the financial connection is severed. At this point, the Pakistani migrant takes his place in the new country, even if it means being a second-class citizen. If he is in the West, he usually defines himself as a ‘Muslim’ or ‘South Asian’ or sometimes even an ‘Indian.’ He then ceases to have a meaningful relationship with Pakistan.

This depressing state of affairs is due to the identity struggle within Pakistan itself. Pakistanis abroad don't know who they are or how they should relate to Pakistan because they don't know what it means to be Pakistani. One of the principal identity-markers that Pakistanis abroad have turned to is to re-define themselves as ‘Muslim’. This has been especially true after 9/11, but pre-dates that event as well. It has been disturbing to watch and experience because no other diaspora from a Muslim majority country makes their national identity subservient to their religion – not even the stateless Palestinians. While everyone else seems to take pride in their particular national histories – even when there isn't much to be proud of – people in the Pakistani diaspora seem to run away from being associated with their country's past.

As a result, Pakistanis exceed all others in becoming attracted to romanticist readings of the past – the sort extremist religious teachers are more than happy to offer up. Another popular trend among second-generation Pakistanis in the West is the denouncing of independence as a mistake. Since Pakistanis never bother learning about their country's history they delusionaly believe it was a 'part' of India. These people live in a fantasy world where 60 years of conflict with another state can be overcome in a singular moment of sublimation. What's illuminating is that Bangladeshis never talk about joining India or West Pakistan in such a manner.

Indeed, the Pakistani diaspora is in a difficult place. It cannot actively participate in the discussion about Pakistani identity, but it also cannot progress until this issue is resolved. Guidance must come from Pakistan itself. There are some signs that this has started. Recently a federal minister began rolling out all sorts of incentives for Pakistanis in the diaspora. These include an overseas pension trust, a plan to protect expat properties back home, waivers of service charges and custom duties, special treatment in housing and college admissions, and finally, honorary seats in the various legislative houses. The aim would be, in the words of the minister, to "grant VIP status" to the expats. This minister's attempt to include the diaspora is worthwhile, however, the entire scheme is built upon preferential treatment, which only further enhances class differences and hierarchy between Pakistanis. It also assumes, wrongly, that simply because they have money, Pakistanis in the diaspora have a good idea about how to improve Pakistan. A political or legislative solution is neither sufficient, nor, given rampant cronyism, ideal. It also creates the danger of politicizing the overseas communities and splintering them based on political preferences.

The focus at the moment has to be on culture and identity. The promotion of Pakistani arts, music, literature, cinema, poetry, and fashion is of the essence. And the answer does not lie with the venal fashion shows that are put on at sumptuous diplomatic residences, inviting only a few elite expats. Outreach has to be done within expat communities – Dubai, Bradford, Brooklyn. Scholarships should be given to traveling street-theatre artists. Films should be subsidized. Poetry, especially translations, should be promoted and put on popular websites. Instead of becoming a censor-state towards pre-Islamic culture and lifestyle, Pakistan should promote freedom of expression in these issues. Engagement with Pakistan's culture will give adrift Pakistanis around the world a sense of belonging. Effort has to be made to connect Pakistani expats to Pakistan, not via their families, but via the idea of Pakistan itself – via Pakistaniat. It is this sense of confidence that will make Pakistanis want to invest in Pakistan perhaps even return and engage in nation-building. The few successful diaspora activists that I have met have either been motivated through national emergencies such as the earthquake, or they have emerged from a cultural awareness group that was ready to do more. The first time I met Bilaal Ahmed, the founder of IMPAK USA, a service group that sends volunteers to Pakistan, was at the Philadelphia screening of the Pakistani film Khamosh Pani.

Further, as I have previously documented elsewhere, the only meaningful political lobbying group ever formed to lobby the US government, namely Pakistani-American Public Affairs Committee (PakPAC), grew out of a fun-loving social organization for Pakistani doctors, who initially came together to invite poets and singers from Pakistan. There are lessons to be drawn from this. Most people think ‘diaspora’ only when they run into a Pakistani on foreign soil and want to ask about the nearest place to find chicken tikka. Diaspora is, actually, the barometer by which one can judge the health of a nation. The feeble state of the Pakistani diaspora speaks volumes.