1971 War - Myths and Realities 1971

 A compilation of quotes from books refuting common myths about the 1971 war and it's predeceasing events.

Byline: Arshi Saleem Hashmi

December 16 1971 does not bring good memories for Pakistanis; it is the date we lost half of our country. Since 1971 a lot has been published questions have been raised politician and military personalities have been blamed and that continues to happen even today. According to the Hamood-ur-Rehman commission report the defeat suffered was not a result of military factors alone but had been brought about as the cumulative result of political developments that took place between 1947 and 1971. It is unfortunate that instead of an objective analysis of the circumstances that led to the debacle in 1971 one sided accusative approach is adopted to describe the situation during that time. Critiques of Pakistan take no time to come up with the accusation of brutality" being conducted by Pakistan Army without any substantiated data.

A strong narrative based on 'biased propaganda' was promoted without analyzing factors like the role of India Mukti Bahini Awami League and wrong decisions at political level. Unfortunately Bangladeshi youth is also being brought up on this narrative. East Pakistan was not governed properly can be a true assessment but the violence that was unleashed in the year prior to the secession was way too exaggerated. The brutal murder of innocent Bengalis was all classified as the gruesome act of Pakistan Military it actually helped covering the negligence of East Pakistani political and civil administration. The new narrative that was created in the subsequent years was to protect the violence conducted by Mukti Bahini and Awami League's members against those East Pakistanis who were not convinced that the solution to governance problems in East Pakistan was to break away from West Pakistan. 

These patriotic East Pakistanis believed in Pakistan and paid heavy price by losing their lives and damage to property. Later on all the killings were termed as genocide by West Pakistan's policy tool and Pakistan Army was presented as the one responsible for this.

Recently I have gone through few books that record the accounts of primary sources and show the true picture. These books in a way respond to the most prevailing myths about 1971 and East Pakistan. The study of these books reveals the extent and effectiveness of Indian and Awami League propaganda to defame Pakistan and Pakistan Army. These independent scholars who have tried to bring a more scholarly work based on extensive research included personal experience as well as accounts of common Bangladeshis to unravel the true face of negative narratives.

Sarmila Bose is one such author who in her book Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War" provides primary sources interviews detailing the accounts during the time and unfolding many mysteries that have been dominating the literature on East Pakistan situation.

There are many other voices opening up new avenues for researchers and scholars working on Bangladeshi politics and its history. Ikram Sehgal renowned defence expert has come up with his book Escape from Oblivion: The story of a Pakistani Prisoner of War in India". Mr. Sehgal narrates the details about the real situation after Pakistan Army men were taken as prisoners by India.

Similarly the book The Wastes of Time: Reflections on the Decline and Fall of East Pakistan" written by a Bengali professor Dr Syed Sajjad Hussain who remained Vice Chancellor of Rajshahi University and moved to Dhaka University in July 1971 gives an insider's account that unfolds many secrets regarding East Pakistan buried in the history.

In next paragraphs I am reproducing few of the relevant excerpts for the interest of readers that also highlight different but a well-researched view-point about prevailing myths.

Myth: The military operation was conducted against innocent civilians.

Reality: "At the more organised level weapons training started and military-style parades were held carrying weapons both real and dummy. Kaliranjan Shil a Communist activist who survived the army's assault on Jagannath Hall in Dhaka University on 25-26 March wrote that following the postponement of the national assembly on 1 March and the start of the non-cooperation movement as part of the struggle the student union started 'training in pre-paration for war with dummy rifles on the Dhaka University gymnasium field... I was also taking training in a group. In a few days our first batch's training was completed and along with girl-students' group three groups of us took part in a march-past on the roads'. Photographs of marching girls carrying rifles appeared in the foreign media during this period and images of such gatherings and parades are displayed with pride in the Liberation War Museum in Dhaka. 

 The invocation of Gandhi's name in connection with the Bengali uprising of 1971 is not only entirely inappropriate it is patently absurd. Mujib 'the apostle of agitation' seeking power through brilliant oratory and electoral politics did not speak the language of Gandhi or think his thoughts. Crowds did not go to hear Gandhi armed with guns rods and spears." (Sarmila Bose Dead Reckoning: Memories of 1971 Bangladesh War Page 26)

Myth: There were over 3 million killings of Bengalis during the military operations.

Reality: "Examination of the available material on the 1971 war in both Bengali and English showed that while the allegation of 'genocide' of 'three million Bengalis' is often made in books articles newspapers films and websites it is not based on any accounting or survey on the ground. Sisson and Rose state that the figure of three million dead was put out by India while some Bangladeshi sources say it was the figure announced on his return to Dhaka by Sheikh Mujib who in turn had been 'told' that was the death toll when he emerged from nine months in prison in West Pakistan. It is unclear who 'told' Sheikh Mujib this and on what basis. However Sheikh Mujib's public announcement of 'three million dead' after his return to the newly created Bangladesh was reported in the media.

For instance on 11 January 1972 in The Times Peter Hazelhurst reported from Dhaka on Mujib's emotional home-coming: in his first public rally in independent Bangladesh Mujib is reported to have said 'I discovered that they had killed three million of my people'." As the earlier chapters indicate my own experience in Bangladesh was very similar with claims of dead in various incidents wildly exceeding anything that could be reasonably supported by evidence on the ground. 'Killing fields' and mass graves were claimed to be everywhere but none was forensically exhumed and examined in a transparent manner not even the one in Dhaka University. Moreover as Drummond pointed out in 1972 the finding of someone's remains cannot clarify unless scientifically demonstrated whether the person was Bengali or non-Bengali combatant or non-combatant whether death took place in the 1971 war or whether it was caused by the Pakistan Army.

Ironically as Drummond also points out the Pakistan Army did kill but the Bangladeshi claims were 'blown wholly out of proportion' undermining their credibility. Drummond reported that field investigations by the Home Ministry of Bangladesh in 1972 had turned up about 2000 complaints of deaths at the hands of the Pakistan Army." (Sarmila Bose Dead Reckoning: Memories of 1971 Bangladesh War Pages 175 177)

Myth: The riches of East Pakistan (Sonar Bangla) were exploited by West Pakistanis.

Reality: "The second move in the game was to build up an equally fictitious image of a Bengal overflowing with milk and honey which had been delivered over to Pakistan. The so-called Bengali scholars claimed to discover almost every day more and more evidence of a rich cultural heritage in Bengal's past now exposed to risk. The fact that the province had not yet recovered from the devastating famine of 1943 and the ravages of the Second World War was conveniently overlooked. Nor did anybody care to draw. attention to the recurring cycle of famines and shortages which has been a constant in Bengal's history. Only about 43 years before the 1943 famine there had been at the turn of the century a terrible famine of the same kind which had taken a heavy toll of human life. Stories of similar food shortages at twenty-five or fifty year intervals form the staple of Bengal's literature. But the illiterate public in Bengal have a short memory and are apt to forget inconvenient truths.

They love day-dreaming. Oblivious to the picture of this barrenness and starvation the image they love to cherish of Bengal is that of an inexhaustible granary where no one goes hungry"... No one could deny either openly or secretly that Bengal overwhelmed with a large population needed foreign capital for development since she had no capital herself. On the other hand the presence of outsiders who seemed to possess both money and skill was keenly resented. To rationalise the resentment they created the myth that the outsiders were not really helping in the development of her resources but fleecing Bengal. There had existed they maintained back in the dim past of Sonar Bangla a Golden period when the country lacked nothing. The outsiders had eaten her resources away reduced her to destitution and poverty and degraded her to her present position. The myth took hold on the imagination of the public.

In their lucid moments of course they remembered how relentless the realities around them were. But the natural bent of their minds towards romanticism and emotionalism gave rise to puerile fancies without the slightest foundation in fact about the wealth and resources of the motherland. The Indian conspirators kept fanning this puerilism taking advantage of the inevitable frictions which the advent of foreign capital produces in any society." (Dr Syed Sajjad Hussain The Wastes of Time: Reflections on the Decline and Fall of East Pakistan Pages 111 112 117)

Myth: Pakistan Army alone is responsible for all violence.

Reality: By the time I reached my unit my world had been turned topsy-turvy the writing clearly on the wall. One could never believe that the 2E Bengal had killed their West Pakistani colleagues. Sadly it was true. The massacre of the family of Subedar Ayub was especially heinous and unforgiveable. All these officers had repeatedly been warned by West Pakistani officers that they would be killed if they did not leave the unit. During those critical days some Bengali officers even advised them to take leave or go to Dacca on some pretext. All of them without exception refused to take the easy exit by abandoning the unit. It was unthinkable on their part to do so particularly at such a juncture. They all were of the sentiment that if they stood their ground they will be able to stop any action that might be taken against their unit. But they proved to be gravely wrong. They were murdered their martyrdom proves that they were heroes by all means.

Their killing is a dark stain on history and can never obliterate the fact that they were a fine battalion." (Ikram Sehgal Escape from Oblivion: the Story of a Pakistani Prisoner of War in India Page 6)

Myth: India entered the war in December 1971 and was trying for peaceful political solution to the problem from the outset.

Reality: The date of the start of full-fledged war between India and Pakistan in 1971 is a contested issue. The date popularly given out is 3 December the one announced by India but this is merely the date the war spread to include the Western sector. In a sense India's involvement in the war may be taken to be from March and its involvement in the politics of the province perhaps from even earlier. Numerous Bangladeshi pro-liberation accounts blithely recount close contact and coordination with authorities prior to the military action taken by the Pakistani Regime as well as in-year. Many of the Pakistani officers I spoke to described Indian involvement and casualties in 'actions' in East Pakistan throughout the year

'The big operations are always done by the Indians' reported The Guardian on 18 September 1971 after an ethnic Bengali who blended in with the local population and needed no translation visited the training camps of the Mukti Bahini in India and crossed in to East Pakistan with a guide on his own. Of the couple of hundred Bengali 'volunteers' who were said to be in the border area he visited only six had been given any training at all and only three had taken part in any operation" The American government was correct in its assessment that India had already decided to launch a military operation in East Pakistan when Mrs. Gandhi came to Washington in early November pretending that she was still seeking a peaceful solution". (Sarmila Bose Dead Reckoning: Memories of 1971 Bangladesh War Pages 172 173)

Myth: The West Pakistanis imposed their culture on Bengalis.

Reality: During the Civil War of 1971 there was a great deal of talk in the American Press particularly in such journals as Time and Newsweek about the revolt of the Bengalis against the attempted imposition of an alien culture upon them by the Punjabis. In so far as the term Bengalis connoted Bengali Muslims this was of course a plain lie there having been no difference between the culture of one section of Muslims and another in Pakistan. In so far as the statement referred to the original culture of the local inhabitants there was not much in it which one could consider worth defending. There was in either case no truth in the allegation that the inhabitants of East Pakistan were being forced to accept a way of life repugnant to them.

What had indeed been happening since the adoption of policy of industrialisation by Pakistan was that the crust of old customs and superstitions was gradually breaking up people were beginning to understand the advantages of modern comforts; polished floors were being substituted for mud and sand bamboo being replaced by cement concrete porcelain taking the place of brass and bell-metal chairs and tables being substituted for cane mattresses. New roads better communications the influx of capital from abroad the growth of industrial townships the arrival of new skills and techniques had begun to erode the traditional pattern of life and end the old isolationism. An air of cosmopolitanism filled the atmosphere. Bengalis both Hindus and Muslims were being forced increasingly to come into contact with foreigners whose ways and judgments were so different.

The opening of airports in remote areas like Lalmonirhat or Shaistanager the setting up of a paper mill at Chandraghona or a newsprint mill at Khulna the establishment of a network of jute mills all over the province the discovery and utilisation of gas at Haripur and Titas disclosed new potentialities at the same time that they opened up possibilities of change never foreseen." (Dr Syed Sajjad Hussain The Wastes of Time: Reflections on the Decline and Fall of East Pakistan Page 116)

Myth: West Pakistani Army was the 'occupying force' whereas Indian Army was a 'liberation army'.

Reality: "The Pakistan army is also constantly referred to in the Bangladeshi literature as an occupying force' or 'hanadar bahini' (invading force raiders). This is a mindless misrepresentation of reality. In 1971 East Pakistan was a province of Pakistan a country created in 1947 as a homeland for South Asia's Muslims through a movement in which East Bengal played a significant role. The Pakistan army was present in the province as it was in other provinces of the newly created state. Bengalis served both in the existing units of the army and in the special Bengal regiments raised later. Just as West Pakistanis served in East Pakistan Bengali officers were posted in West Pakistan.

Bengalis who later decided they wanted to secede from Pakistan and fight for an independent country could have termed the Pakistan army 'shotru' 'enemy forces' whom they wished to eject instead of resorting to pointless attempts to erase history by labelling them 'occupying' or 'invading' forces as though they had suddenly appeared from a foreign land. Moreover many Bengalis did not support the idea of secession and continued to consider the Pakistan regime the legitimate government and some Bengali officers continued to serve in the Pakistan army defending what was still Pakistani territory. There was only one 'invading force' in East Pakistan in 1971 that was India." (Sarmila Bose Dead Reckoning: Memories of 1971 Bangladesh War Page 163)

Myth: Bengali language was fundamental part of Bengali nationalism.

Reality: "The Indians began by painting a dismal picture of the subservience to which the Bengali-speaking Muslims of East Pakistan would be reduced in the event of Urdu being declared Pakistan's state language. The Bengali-speaking Hindus of West Bengal saw no threat to their identity in the adoption of Hindi as the Indian state language. This was perverse logic. We seemed to be back in the world of Humpty Dumpty. But the so-called intellectuals of East Pakistan failed to see through the Indian game and immediately took up the cry that Bengali had to be saved from the threatened onslaught. A myth was concocted almost overnight about a conspiracy against the Bengali language" What on the contrary the Awami Leaguers assisted by the left-wing journalists fanned all the time was the cult of Bengali nationalism. Here again their dishonesty was transparently plain.

They didn't contend that the entire subcontinent needed reorganising on linguistic lines or that each major language group in Pakistan and India called for recognition as a separate nationality with a right to self-determination. The theory was applied to the Bengalis of Pakistan only. The Bengalis in West Bengal in India could stay where they were; the Marathis the Tamils the Andhras---all belonged to the Indian nation and nothing illogical could be seen in their union into a single State of the disparate language groups which inhabited India. The Nagas ethnically linguistically and culturally differed from the rest of India but they received no support although they had been struggling for secession since 1947; their leader Dr Phizo lived in exile in London while Indian tanks armoured cars heavy artillery and bombs helped 'pacify' Naga villages. The disputed area of Kashmir was also left severely alone.

No India had a right to be one and anyone who pleaded for pluralism either politically or culturally was a reactionary. But Pakistan with precisely the same demographic composition as India had to be viewed differently. Never in political history before has the jaundiced eye been so powerfully at work as in India and Pakistan weighing the same problems in the two countries in different scales and insisting on different conclusion." (Dr Syed Sajjad Hussain The Wastes of Time: Reflections on the Decline and Fall of East Pakistan Pages 111 213)

Myth: Armed activities against non-Bengalis were carried out by Mukti Bahini guerrilla only and not the Indian Army.

Reality: "Bengali accounts of the 'heroic' exploits of rebel fighter in the war are punctured by some accounts given by their powerful allies the Indians. 'It can now be said' wrote Maj. Gen. Sukhwant Singh 'that despite the Awami League's hold on the Bengali troops in the name of patriotism Mujib's charisma and the professional contacts in the armed forces of Col Osmani the organizers of the insurgency had not been able to draw up and implement an integrated plan... the revolt had no strong popular base'. Initially the Indian Border Security Force (BSF) supported the operations of the rebels but 'Unfortunately these efforts were not very effective'. 'The failure of the revolt and the poor results obtained by the rebel forces in their operations after crossing into India led to a detailed appraisal of the situation by the Indian Government in the last week of April'. According to Maj. Gen. Singh 'the Indian Army was asked to take over the guidance of all aspects of guerilla warfare on 30 April'"

The assessment of Maj. Gen. Lachhman Singh was similar: 'The Mukti Bahini fighter was not a dedicated guerilla... the Awami League leaders were reluctant to join them and face the hazards of military struggle. The guerillas had no safe bases for operations inside East Pakistan but could safely operate from camps across the Indian border'. In Singh's view 'It was becoming clear by July that Mukti Bahini was unable to win the confidence of the villagers'. They also avoided direct confrontation with the Pakistan army owing to the heavy casualties they suffered. However 'The propaganda machine worked hard and to good effect. Dressed in a Iungi and rifle in hand the Mukti Bahini guerilla became an instant hero... The news-hungry press swallowed claims of fictitious successes which were widely believed." (Sarmila Bose Dead Reckoning: Memories of 1971 Bangladesh War Pages 146-47)

Myth: Pakistani soldiers carried out rapes of university student during Operation Searchlight.

Reality: "None of the Bengali eye-witness accounts nor the testimony to me of Pakistan army officers involved in the action nor the evidence of the recorded radio communication among them mention Rokeya Hall the women's hostel of Dhaka University as a target of military action. Yet a story had circulated in 1971 repeated to me by members of the Bangladeshi intelligentsia about the women's hostel being attacked and girls jumping out of the windows. In reality like the other hostels Rokeya Hall had also emptied of its normal residents before 25 March and did not seem to have been a targeted building. Similarly as attested in Jahanara Imam's book by a terrified resident of Mohsin Hall the army did not go to Mohsin Hall either." (Sarmila Bose Dead Reckoning: Memories of 1971 Bangladesh War Page 57)

Myth: 93000 Pakistani soldiers became POWs to India.

Reality: "One of the most notable 'numbers' of 1971 in circulation is the assertion that '93000 Pakistani soldiers' were taken prisoner by India at the end of the war. This statement has been repeated virtually unchallenged in practically every form of publication. It is a number about which one expects a certain precision after all the number of POWs in India had to be an exact figure not an approximation. Yet it turns out that 93000 soldiers were not in fact taken prisoner.

In March 1971 the number of West Pakistani troops in East Pakistan was reported to be 12000. More forces were brought in to cope with the crisis and Lt Gen A. A. K. Niazi Commander of the Eastern Command in 1971 from April to December wrote: 'The total fighting strength available to me was forty-five thousand 34000 from the army plus 11000 from CAF and West Pakistan civilian police and armed non-combatants'. Out of the 34000 regular troops 23000 were infantry the rest being armour artillery engineers signals and other ancillary units.

How did 34000 army personnel plus 11000 civilian police and other armed personnel a total of 45000 men more than double into '93000 soldiers' who were reported taken prisoner by India in December" (Sarmila Bose Dead Reckoning: Memories of 1971 Bangladesh War Page 174)